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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, I review the literature on
child care subsidies, discussing three main strands to which I contribute: general equilibrium
models of skill investment, estimations of skill accumulation technologies, and evaluations
of child care subsidy programs. In the second chapter, I lay out a model of child care
subsidies in an environment where one- and two-parent families form endogenously and then
altruistically invest in their children’s skill, using both their own time and time purchased
on the market in the form of child care. I compare welfare gains under three possible designs
for a child care subsidy, which differ in the pool of those entitled to receive the subsidy (the
eligible). In the third chapter of my dissertation, I go into detail on the estimation of the skill
accumulation technologies used by one- and two-parent families to invest in their children.
In this section I describe my main data source (the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study,
Birth Cohort), the econometric methods used to find point estimates, the implications of
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The model presented and estimated in chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation is related to
three main strands of the literature on human capital. First, studies of skill investment
subsidies in general equilibrium; second, estimations of skill accumulation technologies; and
third, evaluations of child care subsidy programs. In this chapter, I provide context for the
model I develop within these three strands.
I first provide a broad overview on the outstanding studies in macroeconomics that addresses
skill accumulation subsidies in general equilibrium, with a focus on those that consider
parental investment in children’s skill. Here I want to highlight the way in which the model
in Chapter 2 of this dissertation departs from the standard framework in the literature, and
why this departure is a useful one. Second, because the most important primitive for my
analysis are the two skill accumulation technologies, I give a short discussion of the literature
on the estimation of these functions. In the course of this discussion I make the case for my
choice of data set relative to the other similar estimations in the literature. Finally, I briefly
review the large body of work estimating the treatment effects of child care subsidies on
child outcomes, using data on both randomized controlled trials and natural experiments.
This discussion is meant to highlight both the fact that the sign and magnitude of these
effects is not a settled question, and that a structural model can be useful precisely because
it makes explicit general equilibrium feedbacks from such interventions.
1.1 Skill Investment Subsidies in General Equilibrium
The focus of the macroeconomic literature on intergenerational transfers is usually to de-
compose intergenerational elasticity (IGE) in earnings or to examine the sources of income
inequality. Studies then examine welfare gains from subsidies directed at different points
in the lifecycle (e.g., Restuccia and Urrutia (2004), Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011),
Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2016), Gayle, Limor, and Soytas (2017), Daruich (2017),
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Lee and Seshadri (2018)). The reason the IGE is a statistic of interest is that environments
with a higher IGE are more risky ex ante. A utilitarian social planner will see an increase
in welfare from subsidies that lower the IGE. A similar logic motivates the focus on income
inequality.
To generalize away from specific statistics and toward a common question they are used
to address, general equilibrium studies of skill investment subsidies that incorporate family
investments are interested in the degree to which heterogeneity in outcomes at adulthood
is due to individual-level characteristics at birth as opposed to characteristics of the family
into which a child is born.
The standard framework used in these studies is one with overlapping generations, where
families invest in the next generation of their dynasty with time and money. The motive
for these investments can be altruistic (parents internalize the actual outcomes of their
children) or paternalistic (parents only care about the transfers, not their effect). In such
studies, families usually consist of one-parent and one-child, while targeted moments are
estimated on samples of two-parent families.
My model extends a common framework found in these studies: among macroeconomic
studies of the welfare effects from policies that distort parental investment in child skill, a
distinctive feature of my paper is that it incorporates a marriage market. This allows one-
and two-parent families to arise endogenously in equilibrium. In my model, the endoge-
nous sorting of adult types across family structures is distinct from the technologies those
structures use to invest in their children. In this way, I separate the endogenous compo-
sition effect from the exogenous primitive differences across family structures in terms of
the skill accumulation technologies parents use to invest in their children. This allows early
childhood education policy and the skill distribution within and across family structures to
interact in equilibrium.
This is an important interaction to endogenize for the following reason. The skill accu-
mulation technology that parents use to invest in their children implies, for a given set of
parameter values, an elasticity of the price of investment with respect to the price of child
care. This responsiveness to the price of child care is allowed to be heterogenous in my
model because I incorporate two distinct skill accumulation technologies. Without endoge-
nous family formation, the family structure with higher sensitivity to the subsidy would be
forced to persist in equilibrium, perhaps inflating gains from the program. Allowing the
most sensitive households to no longer exist once the subsidy has been implemented gives
a more realistic sense of the potential gains from such interventions.
The family formation channel in my model is similar to that of Abbott, Gallipolli, Meghir,
and Violante (2018), which examines how subsidies directed at college students (rather
than parents with young children) can effect the composition of marriages. However, in
2
that study single-parent families do not exist in equilibrium.
1.2 Estimations of Skill Accumulation Technologies
The skill accumulation technology is a function which governs the ability of investments
to affect the stock of skill, and the relative contribution of different kinds of investments
(such as money and time) to skill accumulation. There are many ways to formulate this
technology (see Todd and Wolpin (2003) for an overview of this modelling decision). Studies
that use skill accumulation technologies commonly specify functions are constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) or Cobb-Douglas; typical arguments include the current stock of skills,
parental skills, local environments, and investment in terms of money and time.
There are two surveys commonly used to estimate these technologies: the Children of the
National Longitudal Survey of Youth 1979 (Children of the NSLY79) and the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics, Child Development Supplement (PSID CDS). The design of these
surveys limits the kinds of functional forms that are estimable using the information they
provide. For example, in the Children of the NLSY79 there is no time diary and little
information on fathers.
To my knowledge, only Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall (2014) and Abbott (2018), both
using the PSID CDS, incorporate father’s time into the skill accumulation technology as
a separate input. To do so, these studies capitalize on child time diaries which report
on activities with both members of a parenting couple. These two studies differ in the
functional form they estimate: Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall (2014) uses a Cobb-Douglas
functional form, while Abbott (2018) estimates rather than assumes the complementarity
parameter by estimating a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functional form. Both
focus on two-parent families.
I use the ECLS-B to estimate distinct CES skill accumulation technologies for couples and
single mothers. I chose to use the ECLS-B rather than the PSID CDS because of its large
sample and its emphasis on the time investments of both mothers and fathers in their child,
and it contains more observations at earlier ages and for a larger sample than that available
in the PSID CDS. One drawback of the ECLS-B relative to the PSID CDS is that it does
not have a time diary: rather, parents report frequency of activities they do with their child
on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis. I use an imputation strategy, described in detail in
chapter 3 of this dissertation, so map from frequencies to levels of time inputs from parents
in the ECLS-B.
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1.3 Empirical Evaluations of Child Care Subsidies
Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation lay out a model and estimation for an environment in
which the government subsidizes non parental child care. In practice, treatment effects for
subsidized child care during early childhood are estimated from randomized control trials
(RCTs) like the Abecedarian or Perry Preschool Projects, or from natural experiments using
large-scale policy reforms.
Treatment effects of subsidized child care from RCTs are limited by the non-representativeness
of the target group: these RCTs were usually targeted at children from impoverished fam-
ilies, who are often single mothers. Treatment effects estimated from large-scale interven-
tions, however, are limited by the need to find a natural experiment (through geographic
variation in the intensity of the subsidy, for example), and by the quality of long-term mea-
sures of outcomes due to short panels (which forces authors to use childhood test scores
or grade repetition, rather than adult earnings of the treated vs. untreated children). On
the other hand, one benefit of large-scale policies it that they are often universal, so that
(unlike the RCTs) the treatment effects of these interventions can be estimated across the
entire income distribution for the children’s families.
It is important to keep in mind that direct comparison of treatment effects from large-scale
subsidies with those estimated from the RCT data is problematic, because the subsidized
child care is not the same quality. That is, the high quality of the Abecedarian and Perry
Preschool Programs is not replicated in large-scale subsidized child care at a national scale.
Whether or not high-quality child care programs can be scaled up to reach large numbers
of children with the same degree of effectiveness is an open question.
The main findings of the empirical evaluations can be summarized as being positive for
the RCTs and mixed for the large-scale policies. Recently, both literatures have begun
to emphasize heterogeneity in treatment effects, by gender of the child and the outside
option for child care in the RCT literature, and by family income in the large-scale policy
evaluations.
Specifically, evaluations of randomized control trials like the Abecedarian or Perry Preschool
Projects, have found that the sign of the treatment effect for subsidized child care depends
on what the subsidy is crowding out, such as home care versus alternative child care. This
outside option is in turn predicted by family structure and income (Garcia, Heckman, and
Ziff (2017), Anderson (2008)). Outcomes in these datasets are measured in a variety of
ways and are available over long panels.
By comparison, studies of universal child care subsidies examine Quebec (Kottelenberg
and Lehrer (2017), Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008), Baker (2011)), Norway (Havnes
and Mogstad (2014)), Denmark (Gupta and Simonsen (2010)), and Argentina (Berlinski,
4
Galiani, and Gertler (2009)). These studies measure child outcomes in various ways, de-
pending on the quality of available data: some use child test scores, while others use actual
earnings data for the children as adults. Keeping this caveat in mind, the literature has
found mixed effects on child outcomes. For example, Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008)
find negative average treatment effects, while Berlinski, Galiani, and Gertler (2009) find
positive ones. Recent papers which focus on heterogeneity in treatment effects include
Havnes and Mogstad (2014) and Kottelenberg and Lehrer (2017). They find that children
from poor families benefit the most, while those from families with higher incomes actually
seem to be worse off due to the child care subsidies.
The fact that both Havnes and Mogstad (2014) and Kottelenberg and Lehrer (2017) find
negative treatment effects for children in the upper parts of the family income distribution
is puzzling. If child care is an input into skill production for children, and child care
subsidies lower the cost of that input, then these subsidies weakly expand a families’ choice
set. That is, enrollment is not compulsory, and yet some families enroll children in child
care programs which adversely affect those children’s outcomes. From a decision-theory
point of view, there is no reason for parents to rationally do this if they care about their
children’s outcomes. This is why general equilibrium, rather than partial equilibrium, is
the appropriate framework to examine the long-run effects of child care subsidies.
Child care subsidies are of course not the only policy instrument that affects parental in-
vestment in child skill (Mullins (2018), Low, Meghir, Pistaferri, and Voena (2017), Guner,
Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2016)). Although there is merit in pointing out the perhaps un-
intended effects of other policies on child skill, I chose child care subsidies to emphasize
clarity of interpretation in my policy analysis.
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Chapter 2
Child Care Subsidies with One-
and Two-Parent Families
2.1 Introduction
Large-scale subsidized child care programs have been implemented around the world.1 These
large-scale programs are built on the success of smaller programs, which provided enriched
early childhood environments for children from poor families and have shown potentially
major gains from public intervention.2 Empirical evaluations of large-scale child care subsi-
dies have uncovered heterogeneous treatment effects along the dimensions of family income,
family structure, and child gender, with conclusions differing by the country or state whose
program is being evaluated.3 Designs of these programs vary, but eligibility is usually
universal or means-tested (targeted to poor families).
In this paper, I pursue a structural macroeconomic approach to analyze large-scale child
care subsidies in the United States. The approach allows me to transcend local confound-
ing factors, acknowledge general equilibrium effects on wages, the government budget, and
marriage, and to evaluate policy designs that have not been already implemented. Specifi-
cally, I examine child care subsidies under three eligibility rules: universal, subsidies to the
poor, and subsidies to one-parent families. To do this, I construct a general equilibrium
overlapping generations model with families that are heterogeneous in income and marital
status. My model takes into account endogenous family formation and altruistic parental
1Examples include: Oklahoma (started in 1998), Quebec (1997), Argentina (1993), Norway (1975), and
Denmark (1964).
2Two well-known examples are the Abecedarian Program and the Perry Preschool Program. See An-
derson (2008), Garcia, Heckman, Leaf, and Prados (2016), and Baker (2011).
3Studies of large-scale child care subsidies include Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008), Gupta and
Simonsen (2010), Berlinski, Galiani, and Gertler (2009), Havnes and Mogstad (2014), Kottelenberg and
Lehrer (2017), Blau and Currie (2006).
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investment in child skill (Becker and Tomes (1979)). The three eligibility rules I examine
permit a meaningful comparison between a targeting rule a model like mine can evaluate
and more commonly implemented policies. In my analysis, I focus on the distribution of
welfare gains across gender, skill, marital status, and age.
Comparing these subsidies in general equilibrium allows me to incorporate adjustments in
labor income taxes, wages, and marriage decisions in response to policy. This feedback can
magnify or mitigate the gains from the subsidy. For example, increases in skill, if accompa-
nied by much higher labor income taxes to fund those increases, may not raise disposable
earnings, consumption, or welfare for some groups. This is the case under a subsidy targeted
to the poor. Similarly, endogenizing wages allows changes in the aggregate stock of skill
to affect its rate of return, while endogenizing the family formation decision allows policy
to affect the mass and composition of one- and two-parent families raising children in the
economy. In fact, I find that the marriage rate decreases under the two targeted subsidies I
consider, but increases under a universal child care subsidy. The family formation channel
in my model is similar to that of Abbott, Gallipolli, Meghir, and Violante (2018), who ex-
amines how college tuition subsidies can affect the composition of marriages in the economy,
but who do not allow for single-parent families to exist in equilibrium. The baseline frame-
work into which I incorporate and endogenize heterogeneous family structures has been
used to analyze the interaction of policy and skill investment in many studies, including
Restuccia and Urrutia (2004), Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011), Guner, Kaygusuz, and
Ventura (2016), Gayle, Limor, and Soytas (2017), Daruich (2017), Caucutt and Lochner
(2017), Abbott, Gallipolli, Meghir, and Violante (2018), and Lee and Seshadri (2018).
The subsidies I evaluate generate welfare gains by partially addressing the market failures
of the environment I construct. This model has four main sources of welfare gains: it
insures against a low initial skill for the child, against being born into a family with fewer
resources, and against a poor outcome in a frictional marriage market. In addition, it
partially addresses a fiscal externality to parental investments in their child’s skill.
To be specific, all newborns face risk over their initial skill, because a low draw makes
good outcomes in adulthood harder to achieve. Similarly, the risk of being born into a
low-resource family matters because parents and children cannot contract with one another
(Cunha and Heckman (2007)). The resources available to invest in the child are therefore
determined by the parent’s permanent income, not the child’s permanent income. The
government, however, can use child care subsidies to lower the price of parental investment
in children’s skill, and then tax the child’s labor earnings when they are older. In this way
a child care subsidy combined with a labor income tax mimics a contract the child and
parent would like to make with each other. With regard to marriage market risk, child care
subsidies can partly insure individuals against parenting alone or with a low-skill spouse by
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lowering the costs of being a parent. Finally, the fiscal externality arises from an endogenous
labor income tax. Taxpayers cannot use individual contracts to encourage others to invest
in their children, so that the tax base expands and the labor income tax can decrease for
everyone. A child care subsidy partially addresses this missing market by lowering the cost
of investment in child skill, using funds contributed from everyone in the economy.
In my environment, one- and two-parent families invest in their children using distinct
technologies. Because there is no existing estimation appropriate for my specification, I
estimate these functions using a nationally representative panel dataset from the US De-
partment of Education—the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Birth Cohort (ECLS-B).
The ECLS-B is designed to be representative of the entire population of parents in the
United States with 9-month-old children in 2001, and follows over 10,000 children from 9
months to kindergarten entry, recording their skill at 9 months, 2 years, 4 years, and 5
years of age. In addition to providing a rich source of information on the evolution of skill
in young children, this survey is unique in its emphasis on the role of fathers in child devel-
opment. For almost 1,000 couples over the first three waves of this survey, one can observe
the couple’s hourly wages, their distinct time investments in their children, and their use
of non-parental child care as well as the child care price. For families with single mothers,
the analogous sample contains about 500 families.
The panel nature of the ECLS-B allows me to control for fixed effects within a family
when implementing the estimation of skill accumulation parameters. This accounts for
unobserved and time-invariant heterogeneity in parenting productivity, child attributes,
and local environment that affect the relative productivites of parental time and child care
for investment in skill. My model specification for two-parent families is related to the skill
accumulation technology in Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall (2014), who use the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics, Child Development Supplement (PSID CDS) to estimate a Cobb-
Douglas technology for couples with one or two children with separate time inputs from the
mother and the father. Like them, I find that fathers play a non-negligible role in the raising
of young children. I provide a second estimation for single mothers, which allows a new
comparison of the ways that one- and two-parent families interact with non-parental care.
I find that the input composition of investments is not very sensitive to price changes, and
that single mothers rely more on non-parental child care for investment than two-parent
families do. Consequently, although the price of investment is sensitive to the price of child
care for both one- and two-parent families, the estimation indicates that this sensitivity is
higher for one-parent families.
Using my framework to compare universal subsidies, subsidies to single mothers, and sub-
sidies to poor families, I find that ex ante welfare for families in the baseline economy
increases by 5.9%, with a 70% universal subsidy. Subsidies to single mothers can only reach
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a level of 2.4% welfare gains ex ante (at an 85% subsidy level), and poverty-tested subsidies
provide a 2.0% gain (at an 85% subsidy level). Universal subsidies yield the highest welfare
gains because they more fully insure newborns against the risks they face (which include
both their initial skill and their family), without requiring an increase in the labor income
tax in order to fund them. Subsidies to the poor disincentivize skill investment and require
an increase in the labor income tax to balance the government budget; subsidies to single
mothers, although they do not disincentivize skill investment, provide less insurance than
universal subsidies.
This paper provides three main contributions. First, I incorporate both one- and two-parent
families into an overlapping generations framework to analyze subsidies to investment in
children’s skill. Second, parallel to this heterogeneity in family structures, I introduce
heterogeneity in the technologies that parents use to invest in their children, and provide
estimates of these technologies. Finally, I allow the population to endogenously sort into the
two structures via a marriage market, so that policy can affect the mass and composition
of parents in one- and two-parent families.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I lay out the model. Section 3 presents
the model parameterization, including the estimation of the skill accumulation technologies.
Section 4 reports the subsidy design and level that maximizes ex ante welfare and interprets
the distribution of welfare gains under each eligibility rule. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
There are four sets of agents in the economy: consumers, a representative firm, the govern-
ment, and a non-parental child care provider. Consumers are grouped into families with
either one or two parents, who altruistically invest in their child’s skill with their own time
and purchased child care time, as well as choosing consumption, savings, labor supply and
leisure. The way time inputs affect children’s skill is determined by a skill accumulation
technology, which is indexed by the number of parents in the household. Given prices for
labor and capital, the firm chooses labor and capital inputs to maximize profits subject to
a free-entry condition. The government chooses labor income taxes to finance lump-sum
transfers and non-parental child care subsidies. A child support system exists, enforced by
the government, where single fathers contribute a lump-sum amount that is redistributed
lump-sum and equally to all single mothers. Finally, the non-parental child care sector
supplies child care at the amount demanded in equilbrium, at a price equal to some fraction
of the average hourly wage.
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The Life Cycle of Consumers
Each individual lives for four periods of equal length: childhood, parenthood, adult worker,
and old worker. During childhood, an individual makes no decisions: she is a passive
recipient of consumption and investment chosen by her family. Upon independence, the
individual leaves with her skill to start the parenting phase as an independent decision
maker.
At the beginning of the parenting phase, before any decisions are made, everyone partici-
pates in a marriage market. This market is modelled as a random search with an arrival
rate of one: a potential match is drawn from the skill distribution of the other gender in the
same generation. Once assigned a potential spouse, and knowing that fertility is exogenous
and certain in the environment, the agent compares the expected present discount value of
parenting alone or in a couple.
The gains from joining a couple are reflected by higher efficiencies in translating income into
consumption (introduced with consumption equivalence scales) while the costs are reflected
by the fact that spouses must compromise on time use. In addition, couples use the two-
parent technology to invest in their children. Being a single parent, meanwhile, is an outside
option to marriage that differs by gender. For a woman, single parenthood means that she
keeps her children with her, using the one-parent technology to invest in them, and receives
lump-sum child support transfers from single fathers. For a man, single parenthood means
that he cannot directly affect his child’s skill with his time use, but does have to pay a
lump-sum child support tax to the single mother.4
Whether parenting alone or in a couple, the lifetime utility of any individual contains a
term that incorporates rational expectations about the lifetime utility of one’s child.5 This
expectation is taken over the initial skill of the child, which is drawn from an exogenous
distribution and is unknown when the marriage decision is made. The predictive power of a
child’s initial skill for lifetime utility, however, endogenously responds to policy. This, along
4The outside option to parenting in a couple differs by gender in the model because, empirically, the
vast majority of single parents who are raising young children in their home are women. For a discussion of
what the ECLS-B offers in terms of discipline on contributions of parental time from single fathers, see the
appendix.
5This is what makes parents altruistic. An alternative way of incentivizing intergenerational transfers
is through paternalistic preferences, or “warm glow” returns (Andreoni (1990)). The benefit of motivating
parents with altruism is that the returns to investment can respond rationally and endogenously to policy,
because parents fully incorporate the economic returns to their investment in terms of their child’s lifetime
utility. The main benefit of a paternalistic specification is its tractability and flexibility in matching parenting
behaviors. Some models combine the two, and include both altruism and a paternalistic preference for, say,
college attainment which is distinct from its monetary returns. For an application of paternalistic preferences
to intergenerational transfers of wealth, see De Nardi (2004).
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with the endogenous labor income tax, is the channel by which policy affects the family
formation decision.
Once a potential couple has compared their two alternatives, a marriage requires that both
the husband and wife accept the match (the two individuals remain single otherwise). After
the marriage market, single mothers and couples draw the initial skill of their two children,
which is the same for both children (single mothers and couples each raise both a son and
a daughter). Given their beliefs about how skill affects lifetime utility, parents then choose
the level and composition of investment in their children’s skills. At the end of the parenting
phase, the children leave their parents’ state space, and parents enjoy an altruistic return
from the lifetime utilities of their children.
The problems of the adult worker and the old worker periods differ only in that old workers
die at the end of their phase, so in the last period of the old worker phase there is no
savings decision. Before old age there are no borrowing constraints: borrowing constraints
on the parents are not a source of market incompleteness in this model. To summarize, the
shocks in the life of an individual are their own initial skill, their gender, the family that
raises them, their potential spouse, and the draw of their children’s initial skill. Figure 1
illustrates the timing of the phases and the draws of these shocks.
Figure 2.1: Life Cycle of the Consumer
One- and Two-Parent Families
The two family structures are different in that they have different efficiencies of consumption
({φs} and {φmc,p, φmc,w}, which are consumption equivalence scales) and are allowed to have
different marginal utilities of leisure (which will be reflected in the parameters of the period
utility functions (us, umc), whose functional forms are defined in the model parameterization
section). Married couples compromise on their leisure decision in the sense that it has to
be the same for both members of the couple. They also use a skill accumulation technology
specific to two-parent families to invest in their children (fmc). Similarly, single mothers
invest in children using a skill technology specific to them (fs).
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Family Problems
The solution to a family’s life-cycle problem is a set of policy functions and value functions.
These functions are defined for young adults (before the marriage decision) with skill θ and
gender g ∈ [1, 2] where 1 is father and 2 is mother, and for one and two-parent families
at each period j ∈ {1, 2, 3} (with the numbers corresponding to parenthood, adult worker,
and old worker, respectively), state z, and the skill of the single parent θ or the skills of the
father f and mother m of the couple (θf , θm). The state space z always contains assets,
which are zero at the start of life, and during parenthood also contains the initial skill of
the child. The value functions are:
• For young adults: V0 (θ, g)
• For single mothers: V SMj (z; θ)
• For single fathers: V SFj (z; θ)
• For married couples: VMCj (z; θf , θm)
The Marriage Decision and Probability of Getting Married
The policy function that maps from the type of the spouse to a yes or no marriage market
decision (dmm (θf , θm, g) ∈ {0, 1}, given the skill θm or θf and gender g of the decision
maker), is a threshold strategy in the skill of the potential spouse. It solves:






VMC1 (z; θf , θm)pi (θc) dθc + (1− δ)
∫
θc
V SF1 (z; θf )pi (θc) dθc
]
(2.1)






VMC1 (z; θf , θm)pi (θc) dθc + (1− δ)
∫
θc
V SM1 (z; θm)pi (θc) dθc
]
where z = {0, θc} is the state space in the first period of life which reflects the zero wealth
all consumers start with and the initial skill of the child θc, and the distribution of initial
child skills has a probability density function given by pi (θc).
Draws for Marriage Offer, Partner Type, and Child Skill
The expected lifetime utility of a child enters into the parent problem. It is an expectation
over outcomes in the marriage market and draws of initial child skill when they become a
parent, as a function of their skill and gender g:







VMC1 (z; θf , θm)pi (θc) dθc + (1− Id)
∫
θc
V SF1 (z; θf )pi (θc) dθc
]
µ (θm, 2) dθm (2.2)







VMC1 (z; θf , θm)pi (θc) dθc + (1− Id)
∫
θc
V SM1 (z; θm)pi (θc) dθc
]
µ (θf , 1) dθf
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where Id ≡ dmm (θf , θm, 1)×dmm (θf , θm, 2) indicates a mutual acceptance of the match, z =
{0, θc} and θc is the child’s initial skill, drawn independently from an exogenous distribution.
In addition, µ (θ, g) is the endogenous distribution over adult skill θ and gender g. In the
following subsections, I define the life-cycle problem for each of the three family types:
single mother, single father, and married parents. In all the family problems, τy is the labor
income tax, τn is the child care subsidy, T are lump-sum transfers, and Tcs are child support
payments.
Single Mother Problem
During parenthood, a single parent chooses consumption c, savings a
′
, non-parental child
care time n, her own time investments in her child q, and leisure ` to solve the following
problem:


























+ (1− τn) pnn ≤ (1 + r) a+ (1− τy)wθ (1− `− q) + T + Tcs
`, n, q ∈ [0, 1] `+ q ≤ 1 n+ q ≤ Jchild
θ
′
c = fs (θc, n, θq)
Here, and in what follows, φs is the consumption-equivalence scale for single-parent families
with children, β is the discount factor (patience), b is the altruism parameter, w denotes
the wage rate, and pn denotes the price of non-parental child care. Jchild is the time
endowment of the child. During the parenting phase, parental and non-parental child care
time investments in child skill affect skill in the next period according to the single parent
production technology. The final child skill enters the objective function of the mother















with the altruism coefficient b. Throughout their childhood, the mother
cannot direct investments separately to the son and daughter. Her children are born with the
same skill and receive the same investments. For a regression motivating this assumption,
see the appendix.
During the adult worker phase, the single mother consumes c, saves a
′
, and enjoys leisure
`:
V SM2 (a; θ) = max
c,a′ ,`










′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ (1− τy)wθ (1− `) + T
` ∈ [0, 1]
During the old worker phase, the single mother consumes c, and enjoys leisure `. She dies
with zero savings:
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V SM3 (a; θ) = max
c,`
us (c, `) (2.5)
c ≤ (1 + r) a+ (1− τy)wθ (1− `) + T
` ∈ [0, 1]
Single Father Problem
During parenthood, a single father chooses consumption c, savings a
′
, and leisure ` to solve
the following problem. They also have to pay child support Tcs which is received by single
mothers:
V SF1 (a; θ) = max
a′ ,c,`








+ ζ (µ) (2.6)
c+ a
′
+ Tcs ≤ (1 + r) a+ (1− τy)wθ (1− `) + T
` ∈ [0, 1]
Single fathers do not internalize their child’s outcome directly; rather, their payoff includes
some function of the aggregate endogenous state ζ (µ), which I will specificy in the pa-
rameterization section. This specification allows policy to affect single fathers through the
distribution of skill µ. This specification also does not allow a single father to use his own
time to invest in his children. I start from the assumption that resident fathers are more
able to invest in their children’s skill with their own time than non-resident fathers. Here,
I take that assumption to an extreme and abstract from single father time investments
entirely, as well breaking the link between the objective function of the single father and
the specific outcomes of their children.
During the adult worker phase, single fathers consume c , save a
′
, and enjoy leisure ` by
solving the following problem:
V SF2 (a; θ) = max
c,a′ ,`











= (1 + r) a+ (1− τy)wθ (1− `) + T
` ∈ [0, 1]
During the old worker phase, the single father consumes c and enjoys leisure `. He dies
with zero savings:
V SF3 (a; θ) = max
c,`
us (c, `) (2.8)
c ≤ (1 + r) a+ (1− τy)wθ (1− `) + T
` ∈ [0, 1]
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Married Couple Problem
During the parenting phase, married couples choose consumption c, savings a
′
, leisure `,
non-parental child care time n and parental time inputs {qf , qm}. Like single mothers,
married couples cannot direct investment by child gender and enjoy an altruistic return
from the lifetime utility of their children as a function of their skill at adulthood.






















+ (1− τn) pnn ≤ (1 + r) a+ (1− τy)w [θf (1− `− qf ) + θm (1− `− qm)] + T (2.9)
`, n, qf , qm ∈ [0, 1] `+ qf ≤ 1 `+ qm ≤ 1 n+ qf + qm ≤ Jchild
θ
′
c = fmc (θc, n, θfqf , θmqm)
Here, φmc,p is the consumption-equivalence scale of a family with two adults and two chil-
dren. The specification I use for the married couple problem is based on Guvenen and
Rendall (2015). As in that study, I motivate the perfect complementarity in leisure of the
spouses with time use data as documented in Aguiar and Hurst (2007), Table V. However,
unlike Guvenen and Rendall (2015), I do not make the marginal utility of leisure stochastic.
In my model, by comparison, the only source of risk in marriage is the initial skill of the
children the couple has together.
During the adult worker phase, married couples consume c, save a
′
, and enjoy leisure `:
















′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ (1− τy)w [θf (1− `− qf ) + θm (1− `− qm)] + T
` ∈ [0, 1]
Here, φmc,w is the consumption-equivalence scale of a family with two adults and two
children. During the old worker phase married couples consume c and enjoys leisure `.
They die with zero savings:









c ≤ (1 + r) a+ (1− τy)w [θf (1− `− qf ) + θm (1− `− qm)] + T
` ∈ [0, 1]
Government
The government collects revenue from labor income taxes τy to finance lump-sum transfers
T and non-parental child care subsidies τn. The variable H is the aggregate supply of labor
efficiency units, and N is the aggregate demand for non-parental child care:
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τywH = T + τnpnN (2.12)
Representative Firm
The firm chooses capital KF and labor inputs HF to maximize profits, taking prices r and










The non-parental child care sector provides N units of non-parental child care at price pn.
The price of non-parental child care is set as a constant fraction κ of the average earnings






wθµ (θ, g) dθ (2.14)
This allows the price of non-parental child care to adjust with the average level of skill in
the economy, but without specifying a production function for non-parental child care.
Equilibrium
Given a government policy {τn}, transfers T , and child support Tcs, a stationary equilibrium
is defined as:
• Prices {r, w} and tax τy,
• Individual marriage decision rules for each type and potential spouse,
• Policy functions for each family type for each period of life j and state z,
• Value functions at the beginning of adulthood V0 and for each family type V SM , V SF , VMC ,
• A non-parental child care price pn,
• Joint distribution µ over adult skill and gender,
such that:
• Capital and labor markets clear.
• The government balances its budget taking prices as given.
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• Family decision rules solve their dynamic problems taking prices and taxes as given.
• The non-parental child care price pn is a constant fraction κ of average hourly earnings.
• The joint distribution µ is stationary.
Market Incompleteness in the Environment
As I discuss in the introduction, the subsidies I evaluate generate welfare gains by partially
addressing the market failures of the environment I construct. A child care subsidy in this
environment yields welfare gains from four main sources: it insures against a low initial
skill for the child, against being born into a family with fewer resources, and against a
poor outcome in a frictional marriage market. In addition, it partially addresses a fiscal
externality to parental investments in their child’s skill.
To be specific, all newborns face risk over their initial skill, because a low draw makes
good outcomes in adulthood harder to achieve. Similarly, the risk of being born into a low-
resource family matters because parents and and children cannot contract with one another
(Cunha and Heckman (2007)). The resources available to invest in the child are therefore
determined by the parent’s permanent income, not the child’s permanent income. The
government, however, can use child care subsidies to lower the price of parental investment
in children’s skill, and then tax the child’s labor earnings when they are older. In this way
a child care subsidy combined with a labor income tax mimics a contract the child and
parent would like to make with each other. With regard to marriage market risk, child care
subsidies can partly insure individuals against parenting alone or with a low-skill spouse by
lowering the costs of being a parent. Finally, the fiscal externality arises from an endogenous
labor income tax. Taxpayers cannot use individual contracts to encourage others to invest
in their children, so that the tax base expands and the labor income tax can decrease for
everyone. A child care subsidy partially addresses this missing market by lowering the cost
of investment in child skill, using funds contributed from everyone in the economy.
When I analyze the results of the policy experiment I conduct, I discuss how different
specifications would affect the magnitude of welfare gains. In particular, I find that universal
subsidies yield the highest welfare gains. This is in part because in this environment, there
is risk over the initial skill of the child which is distinct from the equilibrium distribution
of families and unaffected by policy (because the distribution of initial skill is exogenous).
This makes a universal subsidy yield higher welfare gains than it would in an environment




To implement this model, I grouped the model parameters into those chosen externally,
those estimated outside the model, and those calibrated inside the model. Parameters
chosen externally are drawn from the literature, or using a common rule. Parameters
estimated outside the model refers to the set of parameters that I discipline with data, but
for which I do not have to solve for the model equilibrium to check how the model moment
compares with the moment in the data. These include the skill accumulation technology
parameters, among others, which are estimated using first-order conditions of the parenting
problems (I will explain this estimation in more detail further on in this section). Finally,
the set of parameters calibrated inside the model refers to those parameters for which I have
to solve for the model equilibrium in order to generate a model moment to compare with the
data. These parameters include the altruism coefficient b, the productivity of investment
λ, and the marginal utility of leisure for singles (ψs) and couples (ψmc).
2.3.1 Functional Form Assumptions
Period Utility Functions
Utility functions are defined separately for one- and two-parent families:
utype (c, `) = log (c) + ψtype log (`) , type ∈ {s,mc} (2.15)
Single Father Altruism Term
I set the single father term ζ (µ) equal to the minimum possible outcome in the economy:
ζ (µ) = min
θ,g
V0 (θ, g) (2.16)
In practice, reasonable values for child support transfers (see appendix) are not sufficient
to reach the targeted marriage rate in the internal calibration without further penalizing
the single father path. With this specification, I still make the single father lifetime utility
depend directly on the skill distribution in the economy, as with the other parenting prob-
lems. By comparison, using the average outcome does not sufficiently penalize the single
father.
Distribution of Initial Child Skill
I assume that initial child skill is drawn independently and identically from pi (θc), which I




I specify the skill accumulation technologies to be nested constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) functions with inputs of non-parental time, mother time, and father time (which
aggregate to investment Itype) and between investment and the current stock of skill (which
aggregate to tomorrow’s skill). Specifically, the functional forms of the dynamic equation
for skill accumulation, and how investment is generated from time inputs for the two family




ξ + (1− υ) θξc
] 1
ξ
, type ∈ {s,mc} (2.17)
Is = [γs (θmqm)





(1− α) (γ (θmqm)η + (1− γ) (n)η)
ρ





The parameters γ, γs and α control the relative level of inputs given a price ratio. The
values of η, ηs, and ρ control the percentage change in the ratio of inputs for a percentage
change in the ratio of their prices. With this parameterization, I allow for mother time and
non-parental child care time to interact differently across household structures (i.e., I do
not impose γ = γs and η = ηs).
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In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I explain in detail the data and methods used to estimate
the parameters of this skill accumulation technology. Here, I simply report the final point
estimates in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Parameters of the Human Capital Accumulation Technology
ρ α η γ ηs γs ξ υ
-1.86 0.07 -1.01 0.24 -2.25 0.03 -1.2 0.82
(0.42) (0.03) (0.21) (0.05) (0.90) (0.04) (0.14) (0.03)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the level of state of residence
and calculated using the delta method.
6A different and common way of specifying the investment aggregator is to include money (goods) and
parental time inputs. See the appendix for an exercise where I measure the contribution of child care costs
to expenditures on children in different age groups, using the 2001 PSID and the 2002 PSID CDS. I find
that child care costs are a sizeable compoenent of money spent on children by any measure of spending
on children I consider (the share ranges from 50 to 70 percent of total spending). My specification makes
explicit how expenditures on children affect child skill accumulation through child time use.
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2.3.2 Externally Chosen Parameters
The length of a lifetime and of each phase are proportional to 20 years of childhood and 60
years of adulthood (death at age 80). The discount (patience) factor is set to a yearly value
of 0.96 to match the risk-free interest rate. The time endowment for early childhood is 5
years, which is 0.25 the length of a period (20 years). The capital share of the production
technology is set to a standard value of 0.33, and the depreciation rate of capital is chosen
to be 0. Finally, the consumption equivalence (CE) scales are set using the 1994 scales
from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). These scales
assign a value of 1 for the first adult, and 0.5 for the subsequent adults; for each dependent
the weight is 0.3. They adjust money spent on consumption into units of consumption for
each member of the household. Once children leave the family, the equivalence scale for
single mothers goes back to 1, and the scale for couples falls to 1.5. This is summarized in
Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Externally Chosen Parameters
Symbol Name Value
β Patience 0.9620
Jchild Duration Early Childhood 0.25
{αF , δF } Production Technology {0.33, 0}
{φs} OECD CE Scales: 1 adult, 2 children {1.6}
{φmc,p, φmc,w} OECD CE Scales: 2 adult, 2 children {2.1, 1.5}
2.3.3 Other Externally Estimated Parameters
In Table 2.3, the level of lump-sum transfers T , the level of child support payments Tcs,
and the price of pn are set to 8% of output, 28% of the average per-family transfer, and
35% of the average mother’s wage, respectively. The first target is from the ratio of gov-
ernment transfers to persons for federal benefits from social insurance funds, Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), supplemental security income, refundable tax cred-
its, and other (which includes payments to nonprofit instutitions and student loans, among
other categories) to GDP from the National Income and Production Accounts (NIPA) tab-
ulations.The second is the ratio of average child support payments per month per capita to
average monthly government transfers per family. The third is the average ratio of hourly
price of non-parental child care to hourly wages of mothers in the ECLS-B. See the appendix
for further details on the estimation of these parameters.
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Table 2.3: Externally Estimated Parameters
Symbol Name Source Value
T Transfers NIPA 8% of output
Tcs Child Support Census and NIPA 28% of T
κ pn coefficient ECLS-B 35% ave. mother’s wage
2.3.4 Internally Calibrated Parameters
The parameters b, ψs, ψmc, λ are chosen to bring the model moments in the baseline as close
as possible to the moments in the ”Data” column of Table 2.4. The coefficient b controls
the degree of altruism; ψs, ψmc are the marginal utilities of leisure for singles and married
couples, respectively. The parameter λ is a shifter in the skill technology that scales up
investment into efficiency units in the production of skill.
The moments I chose these parameters to match in the model compared with the data are
the correlation of child skill with family income, the average labor supply of parents with
children under 5 who are between 20 and 80 years old, the percent of single mothers raising
children under 5, and the average time invested by parents of each family structure type.
Note that the correlation of child skill and family income grows to 0.33 by the time the
child is 5 years old (ECLS-B). By contrast, when children are 9 months old, the measures
of skill available in the data are uncorrelated with family income, although they do have
predictive power for later child test scores at age 4. For regressions supporting these points,
see the appendix.
There are two internal calibration moments for which it has proven difficult to match the
model with the data: the correlation of child skill and family income and the levels of time
investments. For the former, in this model the family incomes of couples and singles are quite
different because the marriage market outcome is so closely related to skill. This means that
the income distribution for families raising young children looks like two slightly overlapping
distributions, one for single mothers and one for couples. Within each group the correlation
of child skill and family income is lower than the statistic reported in Table 2.4; once the
differences across family structures are accounted for the correlation looks much higher
(compared to the correlation within family structures) because of the difference in income
levels across the two structures is so high. For the latter, the levels of time investments are
wrong in the sense that the magnitudes are off, but they are also in the wrong order: in the
data, single mothers more education time, on average, than married fathers. In my model
there is no gender wage gap, and the model lacks one reason why fathers in the data have a
higher opportunity cost of their time than mothers do. Consequently, fathers in the model
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oversupply parenting time relative to single mothers.
Table 2.4: Internal Calibration: Targeted Moments + Parameters
Moment Source Data Model
Corr(child skill, family income) ECLS-B 0.33 0.39
Average labor supply CPS 0.31 0.30
Percentage single mothers ECLS-B 0.20 0.20
Average time investments ECLS-B (MM,MF,SM) (8,5.6,7) (9.2,7.6,4.8)
Notes: Internal calibration targeted moments (data v. model).
Time investments are in units of hours per week.
Parameter Name Value
b Altruism coefficient 0.29× β
{ψs, ψmc} Marginal utility of leisure {1.4, 1.4}
λ Productivity of investment 45
Notes: Parameter names and values for internal calibration.
2.3.5 Untargeted Moments
In Table 2.5, I compare the implications of this model with six untargeted moments: the
correlation of hourly wages in spouse (or cohabiting partners), the correlation of parental
time inputs within a couple, the ratio of average hourly wages in married or cohabiting
mothers with single mothers, the average ratio of mother and father time, the average ratio
of mother time and non-parental child care time, and the marriage rate of the poor. For a
comparison of the income distribution in the model with the data, see the appendix.
Table 2.5 shows that the random search marriage market I model captures an appropriate
degree of assortative matching among spouses: the correlation of wages within couples is a
close fit with the data. However, within a couple the model implies a higher correlation of
time inputs than seen in the data. This partly reflects the fact that the levels of wages for
men and women in the model economy have identical distributions, but in the data there
is an unmodelled gender wage gap.
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Table 2.5: Untargeted Moments (Model Fit)
Moment Source Data Model
Correlation of wages within a couple ECLS-B 0.28 0.29
Correlation of time inputs within a couple ECLS-B 0.33 0.46
ave. hourly wages, single mothers
ave. hourly wages, mc mothers ECLS-B 0.67 0.86
Average father timemother time ECLS-B 0.77 0.81
Average mother timenon-parental child care time ECLS-B 0.37 0.18
Marriage rate of the poor ECLS-B (wave 3) 52% 6.4%
Notes: Table 2.5 shows relevant moments for the implications of the model for sorting
across family structures, assortative matching in marriage, patterns of time inputs for
investments in child skill and the marital status composition of the poor. For the
last moment, the poor in the model are defined as the bottom 20% of the pre-tax
family income distribution corrected with CE scales. This follows the definition of
poor families used in the policy exercise of the next section. Correlations are Pearson
correlation coefficients, weighted with survey weights in the ECLS-B and using the
analogous distribution in the model. Ratios use empirical moments from Tables 4 and
5 and analogous moments using the baseline equilibrium of the model.
To examine how mothers sort into the family structures, the third moment looks at the
ratio of their wages across family structures. In the data, single mothers have lower hourly
wages than married mothers. I assume that hourly wages are correlated with parenting
productivity in my estimation, so the sorting across family structures has implications for
the parenting productivities using each of the two technologies in the population. My model
endogenously captures the qualitative attribute of the data: mothers with higher skill tend
to parent in a couple. However, the average hourly wages of single and married mothers in
the model are closer together than in the data. More higher-wage women parent as single
mothers in the model than in the data.
The next two moments in Table 2.5 show the average ratios of time inputs in the model
and in the data. The ratio of time inputs within a couple is quite close to the data, but the
ratio of mother time with non-parental child care time is too low in the model. This reflects
the fact that I did not model child care quality choice, so that only the intensive margin of
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non-parental child care time can adjust to increase child care’s contribution to investment.
Finally, the last row of Table 2.5 shows the marriage rate of the poor in the model compared
with the data. The poor in the model are defined as the bottom 20% of the pre-tax family
income distribution corrected with CE scales. This follows the definition of poor families
used in the policy exercise of the next section. The close link between skill and marriage in
this model means that poor parents (low earners) raising young children are rarely married.
2.4 Policy Experiment and Results
I vary τn over the interval [0, 1] with three eligibility rules: universal, poverty-tested, and
family-tested. Under a universal eligibility rule, every parent receives the subsidy, whereas
under a poverty-tested rule only families in the bottom 20% of the CE-adjusted income
distribution for parenting families in the baseline economy receive the subsidy. I chose this
approach so that the mass of those eligible for the poverty-tested and single mother subsidy
is the same in the baseline (20 percent of parenting families), which makes the two eligibility
criteria more comparable. As Table 9 documents, in practice this means that in the baseline
economy single mothers are overrepresented in the poor compared with the data. For each
τn value I solve for equilibrium and record household decisions for every possible family
type, as well as the endogenous population weights assigned to that family type.
A family type is the marriage structure (single mother, single father, or married couple),
the productivity type of the parent(s), and the initial skill of the children (every single
mother and married couple raises one boy and one girl). An equilibrium output in the
model is structured like a survey dataset, with observations at the family type level and the
endogenous population weights being analogous to survey weights. I use this information
to compute welfare changes under different policies. For each eligibility criteria, I find
the subsidy level that implements the largest ex ante welfare gain for children at birth. I
compare these maximized welfare gains, looking at the distribution of these gains in the
population after birth as well as across initial skill types of children before they know the
family they will be raised in.
For the welfare criterion used to select the best eligibility rule, using either the baseline or the
subsidized equilibrium distribution of families gives the same ranking. For decompositions
of welfare changes, I use the distribution of families in the baseline equilibrium, and when I
present changes in aggregates I use the distribution of families in the subsidized equilibrium.
The former choice is to reflect how the distribution of families in the baseline (those a
policymaker is answerable to when implementing these policies) will evaluate the proposed
child care subsidy. The latter choice is to reflect how the subsidy’s affect on individual
choices in turn distorts aggregates in the subsidized equilibrium.
24
The rest of this section proceeds as follows. First, I report the formulas I use to calculate
welfare gains for different levels and eligibility rules of the non-parental child care subsidy.
Second, I report the best attainable outcome for each eligibility rule (universal, subsidies
to the poor, and subsidies to single mothers), using ex ante welfare by child initial skill
and decompositions of welfare gains by attributes of the population such as age, gender,
marital status, and adult skill level. Differences between the effects of the three eligibility
rules are apparent with the decompositions I report and analyze in the last subsection of
these results. Third, I discuss how some features of my model specificaton are related to
the results.
Welfare Measures
























where type ∈ {SM,SF,MC} is the family structure type, z is the state space at that
phase of life for that family type, and
−→
θ is the vector of adult skill types, equal to θ
in the case of single parents or θf , θm in the case of married couples. The state space z
contains the asset stock; equation (2.20) uses the policy choice for that household at that







change in lifetime utility evaluated at age j, for a given family structure and composition.
To aggregate these welfare changes, I use the distribution of families in the subsidized or
baseline equilibrium (I am specific in each case). I construct the distribution of families I
use to aggregate welfare using the appropriate joint distribution µ, marriage decision rules,
and the exogenous distribution from which the initial skill of the child is drawn.
Ex ante welfare changes in consumption-equivalent units are computed as follows:











This is the consumption-equivalent change in ex ante lifetime utility, evaluated at the skill
type θ and gender g of the child, at an equilibrium indexed by the subsidy τn. Taking the
expectation of ∆W type1 , as defined in equation (2.20), over family structure type, the vector
of skills for the adults in the family
−→
θ , and the initial skill of the child θc, requires the
endogenous distribution of skill for the first two and the exogenous distribution of initial
skill for θc. For the endogenous distribution of skill, one can use either the baseline or
the subsidized equilibrium’s distribution to calculate ex ante welfare gains. Accordingly, I
indicate in each result whether I use the distribution of families in the subsidized equilibrium
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or in the baseline equilibrium.
2.4.1 Welfare Gains: Overall and Decomposition
I tabulate gains in welfare ex ante (for the unborn), and ex post (by age, skill, marital status,
and gender groups). When describing and analyzing the distribution of welfare gains in the
economy under different subsidies, I have separated adults into two groups: low and high
skill. Low skill is defined as those below the 20th percentile of hourly wages in the baseline
equilibrium. This procedure allows for more heterogeneity in the high-skilled group than
the low-skilled group, but a finer decomposition does not reveal a qualitatively different
result from the one I discuss below.
Ex Ante Welfare Gains
Table 2.6 reports ex ante welfare gains for children, overall and by initial skill group (low,
medium, and high). In addition, the second column reports the subsidy level and the
third column reports the marriage rate at that equilibrium. All welfare gains reported in
the last four columns are in consumption-equivalent units, with expectations taken over
the endogenous distribution of families in the subsidized equilibrium and the exogenous
distribution of initial skill.
Overall, universal subsidies yield welfare gains that are 3.5 percentage points higher than
subsidies to single mothers, and 3.9 percentage points higher than subsidies to poor families.
The subsidy levels that achieve maximal gains under the different elibility rules are lowest for
universal subsidies at 70%; for the two targeted policies I consider, they are 85%. Marriage
rates rise under a universal subsidy and decrease under the two targeted subsidies; by
making child care cheaper for any potential match, the subsidy lowers the threshold strategy
of the marriage decision rule. By comparison, targeted child care subsidies raise the value
of being a single parent by more. The reason it does so for the single mother subsidy is
clear; for subsidies to the poor, it is harder to qualify for the subsidy as a couple than as a
single mother (see Table 2.5 for a comparison of the composition of the poor in the model
and in the ECLS-B).
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Table 2.6: Ex Ante Welfare Gains, Subsidized Family Distribution
Welfare Gain Welfare Gain by Skill
Eligibility τ∗n Marriage rate Average Low Medium High
Universal 70% 100% 5.9 6.4 5.8 5.6
Single Mothers 85% 76% 2.4 3.6 2.2 1.5
Poor Families 85% 74% 2.0 3.5 1.8 1.0
Notes: Table 2.6 reports, by eligibility rule, the welfare-maximizing subsidy level, the
marriage rate, and welfare gains on average and by initial skill of the child. Wel-
fare gains are computed using expected gains over outcomes, using the distribution of
families in the subsidized equilibrium, and are reported in percent gain of consumption-
equivalent units that are rounded to the nearest tenth of one percent. Universal sub-
sidies yield the highest gains, followed by single mother subsidies and subsidies to the
poor. Gains are decreasing in initial skill.
In Table 2.7, I present welfare gains using the distribution of families at the baseline equi-
librium. This is a relevant set of statistics because, conceivably, these are the families to
whom policy makers are answerable when the policy is implemented. By comparing Table
2.6 with Table 2.7, it is evident that the ranking remains the same, with the level of gains
almost identical. This is despite large change in economic aggregates and the distribution
of families due the subsidies, as discussed in Tables 2.8 and 2.9.
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Table 2.7: Ex Ante Welfare Gains, Baseline Family Distribution
Welfare Gain Welfare Gain by Skill
Eligibility τ∗n Average Low Medium High
Universal 70% 5.9 6.4 5.9 5.5
Single Mothers 85% 2.1 3.3 1.9 1.4
Poor Families 85% 1.8 3.1 1.5 1.0
Notes: Table 2.7 reports, by eligibility rule, the welfare-maximizing subsidy level
and welfare gains on average and by initial skill of the child. Welfare gains are
computed as expected welfare gains over outcomes, using the distribution of fam-
ilies in the baseline equilibrium, and are reported in percent gain of consumption-
equivalent units that are rounded to the nearest tenth of one percent. The ranking
of subsidies is the same as in Table 2.6; also as in Table 2.6, gains are decreasing
in initial skill.
Aggregate Moments: Comparison Across Eligibility Rules
Table 2.8 contains aggregate moments and equilibrium objects under the three eligibility
rules at the welfare-maximizing level of τn. These aggregates are informative about the
sources of welfare gains reported in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7. Under the single mother
or universal subsidy, the labor income tax falls relative to the baseline by 1.8 and 0.2
percent, respectively. By comparison, a subsidy to the poor requires a 0.8 percent increase
in labor income tax. Subsidies to the poor disincentivize skill investment, and so dampen
the expansion in the labor income tax base compared to the other two eligibility rules (the
percent change in H is lowest for subsidies to the poor). The price of non-parental care
reflects changes in the average hourly wage under each eligibility rule: it rises the most under
the universal subsidy (a 12 percent increase) and the least under the subsidy targeted to
the poor (a 5.7 percent increase). This reflects the magnitude of the change in the average
wage, which follows the same ranking as the change in pn.
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Table 2.8: Macroeconomic Moments and Equilibrium Objects Across Eligibility Rules
r τy pn Y C H K L N Qf Qm
Universal 0.999 0.998 1.120 1.249 1.240 1.245 1.257 0.994 1.893 1.132 1.029
Single Mothers 1.000 0.982 1.079 1.055 1.054 1.053 1.059 1.001 1.095 0.894 0.927
Poor Families 0.999 1.008 1.057 1.023 1.023 1.019 1.031 1.003 1.108 0.855 0.873
Notes: Table 2.8 reports macroeconomic moments and equilibrium objects across eligibility rules at the
welfare-maximizing level of τn. Moments are reported as fractions of the baseline level, to facilitate interpre-
tation in units of percentage change, and are rounded to the third decimal place (nearest tenth of a percent
change). Recall, from the Model section, that the price of non-parental care is not an aggregate endogenous
state but simply a function of it in this model. Moving from left to right, the columns report the interest
rate, the price of child care (pre-subsidy), aggregate output, consumption, labor efficiency units supplied,
capital stock, leisure, non-parental care time, quality time from fathers, and quality time from mothers. All
aggregates use the distribution over families in the subsidized equilibrium.
Output, consumption, hours, the capital stock, child care use, and parental time investments
(columns 5 to 8 and 10 to 12 of Table 2.8) increase the most under the universal subsidy. By
contrast, leisure decreases under the universal subsidy, and average parental time investment
levels decrease under the targeted subsidies. The increase in the labor income tax rate under
poverty-tested subsidies is necessary because the expansion in the supply of labor efficiency
units is low, while the increase in demand for child care is high enough that the costs of
running the child care subsidy program offset the gains resulting from expansions in the
labor income tax base.
Note that the estimated CES complementarity between parental time and non-parental
time in the production of child skill means that, for a fixed level of parenting productivity,
a change in the ratio of prices does not get completely reflected as a change in the ratio of
inputs: that is, parenting time will not be completely crowded out by non-parental care as
the subsidy increases. However, as the distribution of skill in the population increases, the
opportunity cost of parenting time also goes up, while the productivity of non-parental time
remains fixed. The ratio of time inputs into child skill development will reflect the increased
value of parental time, as well as the lowered price of non-parental child care. Note that
inputs from parents only increase under a universal subsidy. Parental time investments
increase under the universal subsidy, but not under the targeted subsidies, because the
marriage rate increases in the former and not the latter. Married couples in turn use a
technology that requires higher levels of parental time inputs. Inputs from fathers fall in
the two targeted subsidies due to decreases in the marriage rate, while inputs from mothers
fall both because of lower marriage rates and because the composition of inputs adjusts to
the subsidy on child care. Although the latter force still applies under universal subsidies,
the higher marriage rate that results under that eligibility rule means that more mothers
are parenting in a couple, and married mothers contribute more hours than single mothers
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do (see Table 3.1 in the Estimation section).
Table 2.9: Income and Earnings Levels and Gini Coefficient Across Eligibility Rules
Income Earnings Pre-tax Income Pre-tax Earnings
mean Gini mean Gini mean Gini mean Gini
Universal 1.235 0.493 1.248 0.823 1.236 0.436 1.247 0.823
Single Mothers 1.054 1.123 1.056 1.040 1.052 1.142 1.054 1.040
Poor Families 1.023 1.186 1.020 1.063 1.023 1.212 1.021 1.063
Notes: Table 2.9 reports average income and earnings, both before and after tax, as
well as the Gini coefficient for each measure. Moments are reported as fractions of
the baseline level, to facilitate interpretation in units of percentage change, and are
rounded to the third decimal place (nearest tenth of a percent change). Before nor-
malizing, averages are calculated using the distribution over families in the subsidized
equilibrium. Income and earnings are reported after labor income taxes are applied.
Income is the sum of labor earnings, income from wealth, and lump-sum transfers,
net of labor income taxes. Pre-tax income contains lump-sum transfers. Relative to
the baseline, both income and earnings increase the most under the universal subsidy.
Inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient decreases under the universal subsidy
and increases under the other two eligibility rules.
Table 2.9 describes the behavior of the earnings and family income distributions relative to
the baseline under the three eligibility rules. Universal subsidies increase average earnings
and income the most, and they do so while decreasing inequality. For the two targeted
subsidies, however, inequality increases even as levels of earnings and income increase.
Targeted subsidies increase inequality by increasing the number of single parents, who
have lower family incomes, and by distorting the skill investment decision at the eligiblity
threshold in the case of subsidies to the poor. Note that after-tax gains in earnings and
income under subsidies targeted to single mothers are higher than pretax levels, while
for subsidies to the poor the opposite is true, reflecting different equilibrium changes in
labor income taxes under the two eligibility rules. Note also that, by comparing the Gini
coefficients of before- and after-tax income, one can see that the labor income tax acts to
decrease dispersion. The dispersion of earnings is unaffected because the labor income tax
is linear.
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Decomposition of Welfare Gains
Table 2.10 decomposes welfare gains by marital status and age across eligibility rules at the
welfare-maximizing level of τn. Besides benefiting directly from receiving the subsidy, gains
during parenthood occur due to altruistic enjoyment of insurance to marriage market risk,
even for ineligible parents, and because of any decrease in the labor income tax resulting
from the subsidy. Later in life, families that were able to save more during parenthood
because of lower parenting costs can afford to finance more consumption and so see higher
gains. Single fathers experience much lower gains from this particular source, and this is
reflected in concentration of welfare gains for that group during the parenting phase.
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Table 2.10: Welfare Gains by Age and Marital Status
Universal Subsidy
Average Married Couples Single Fathers Single Mothers
Parenthood 5.7 5.7 3.9 7.6
Worker 1.6 1.6 0.0 1.7
Old 1.4 1.4 -0.1 1.8
Targeted: Single Mothers
Average Married Couples Single Fathers Single Mothers
Parenthood 2.2 1.2 1.9 8.4
Worker 0.6 0.4 0.1 2.5
Old 0.5 0.2 0.0 2.6
Targeted: Poor Families
Average Married Couples Single Fathers Single Mothers
Parenthood 2.0 1.2 1.5 6.8
Worker 0.3 0.3 -0.1 0.4
Old 0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.3
Notes: Table 2.10 shows the welfare gains for each eligibility rule at the optimal subsidy
level for that rule. Gains are reported at each age, overall and by family structures. Welfare
gains are in percentage point gains of consumption equivalent units, and are aggregated
using the distribution of families at the subsidized equilibrium. Gains are rounded to the
first decimal point (nearest tenth of a percent gain). Under all three eligibility rules, single
mothers gain the most at all phases of life compared to single fathers and married couples.
Because subsidies to the poor require a slight increase in the labor income tax rate and
result in the lowest increase in earnings (see Table 2.9), gains are lowest for this eligibility
rule.
Single mothers benefit more than married couples under all three eligibility rules I consider.
This is because a given level of subsidy has a larger effect on their price of investment
compared with couples (due to the point estimates of the skill accumulation technology,
which I present and discuss in the Estimation section). Compounding this, under either of
the targeted subsidies single mothers are far more likely to receive the subsidies than couples.
Couples under the two targeted subsidy regimes benefit altruistically from marriage market
insurance to their children, and directly from any equilibrium decrease in the labor income
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tax.
Table 2.11: Welfare Gains by Marital Status, Gender, Age and Skill
Universal Subsidy
Married Couples Single Fathers Single Mothers
Low High Low High Low High
Parenthood 6.0 5.7 3.9 3.9 7.8 7.5
Worker 1.5 1.6 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.7
Old 1.4 1.4 -0.1 -0.1 1.6 1.9
Targeted: Single Mothers
Married Couples Single Fathers Single Mothers
Low High Low High Low High
Parenthood 1.3 1.2 1.9 1.9 8.5 8.1
Worker 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.1 2.1 3.8
Old 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 2.3 3.9
Targeted: Poor Families
Married Couples Single Fathers Single Mothers
Low High Low High Low High
Parenthood 2.0 0.8 1.6 1.6 8.2 0.8
Worker 0.6 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.3
Old 0.6 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.3
Notes: Table 2.11 shows the welfare gains for each eligibility rule at the optimal subsidy level for
that rule. Gains are reported at each age, overall and by family structures. Welfare gains are in
percentage point gains of consumption equivalent units, and are aggregated using the distribution
of families at the subsidized equilibrium. Gains are rounded to the first decimal point (nearest
tenth of a percent gain). Across eligibility rules, all parents benefit, even the ineligible: this is due
to decreases in the labor income tax under universal and single-mother subsidies, as well as the
marriage market insurance the subsidy provides under all three eligibility rules (which parents
internalize due to altruism). The gains in the single father column appear identical because of
rounding.
Table 2.11 provies the finest decomposition of welfare gains that I analyze. Here, low skill
is the bottom 20 percent of the skill distribution in the economy. Under all three subsidies,
all parents benefit, but single fathers of any skill level see welfare losses later in life. As with
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ex ante welfare gains, welfare gains for adults at any phase of life are decreasing in skill.
Overall, subsidy levels that maximize ex ante welfare for a given eligibility rule are higher
under targeted subsidies than under the universal subsidy. The optimal level of the subsidy
is determined by balancing gains from insurance and increases in skill with the cost burden
of funding the program. With targeted subsidies, the costs are lower and it takes higher
levels of the subsidy for these costs to begin to offset gains from insurance and increases
in skill. Insurance is an important source of welfare gains here because everyone in this
economy faces risks over their own initial skill, the initial skill of their child, and the skill
of their potential spouse. Without intervention, skill investment is the only way to insure
against those risks. Welfare gains continue to increase with the subsidy until it is quite high
(especially under the targeted eligibility rules) because it provides insurance against poor
outcomes, which in this environment can happen to anyone.
2.4.2 Model Specification: Effects on Welfare Gains
Welfare gains from the subsidy schemes that I study are fairly large, on the order of 2%
to 6% (Tables 2.6 and 2.7). These are comparable the existing literature on the welfare
gains from subsidizing skill accumulation in early childhood, or even later in life (Daruich
(2017), Abbott, Gallipolli, Meghir, and Violante (2018)). As discussed in the Model section,
a child care subsidy in this environment yields welfare gains from four main sources: it
insures against a low initial skill for the child, against being born into a family with fewer
resources, and against a poor outcome in a frictional marriage market. In addition, it
partially addresses a fiscal externality to parental investments in their child’s skill.7
Because I have found that my data do not allow me to predict the initial skill of the child
using family attributes, in the model I have not made the distribution from which the initial
child skill is drawn depend on parental attributes. This choice magnifies the degree of risk
a child faces once they know their initial skill but are still uncertain about their family:
if skill were very persistent across generations, knowing your initial skill would be very
informative about the sort of parents you would have. Likewise, if initial skill were drawn
from a distribution that was endogenous, gains from insuring this risk would be realized by
directly affecting that distribution. Consequently, the welfare gains from universal subsidies
to children before they know their initial skill or family are quite large in magnitude: these
are unavoidable and important shocks to lifetime utility.
In addition, because I have found that I cannot predict initial skill with the measures of
7The term “fiscal externality” is viewed as a misnomer by some economists. Here I use it in the sense
that a child care subsidy affects those not receiving the subsidy (those not parenting, or parents who are not
eligible) indirectly by allowing for a decrease in the labor income tax in equilibrium. See Buchanan (1966)
and Browning (1999).
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prenatal investment that I have in the ECLS-B, I have not modelled choices of parents that
can affect the initial skill of the child (see the appendix for regressions motivating this and
other modelling choices).8 In addition to the fact that initial skill is not persistent across
generations, this means that all parents face the same risk over the initial skill of their
children: they differ in their ability to compensate for a low initial skill by investing more.
A model with persistence in initial skill would reduce this source of risk and open up other
policy discussions (see Abbott, Gallipolli, Meghir, and Violante (2018), and Rustichini,
Iacono, and McGue (2016)).
Risk from the marriage market arises from several sources. The marriage market that I
model is a simple one: potential spouses are matched randomly, and positive assortative
matching by skill occurs because adults have the power to reject the spouse they match
with. A marriage market where search was more directed would reduce the risk faced by a
new adult over the potential spouse they meet, by giving them some control over it. Here, I
only allow parents to provide insurance against marriage market risk by ensuring that their
child has enough skill to not be rejected by the spouse they meet. The individual cannot
affect her chances, but must appear on the marriage market with the skill she has as an
adult and make her decision. I interpret the risk added by the presence of the marriage
market as an upper bound: with a directed search framework, this risk would be mitigated.
Another source of risk in the marriage market stems from the way I set up the married couple
problem. Spouses are not allowed to bargain over the share of household utility they receive.
Instead I emphasize economies of scale in consumption (through consumption equivalence
scales), and gains from teamwork in investment in the couple’s children through the skill
technology. By contrast, a framework with bargaining would have allowed the spouse who
gains the most from the match relative to being single to convince their potential spouse
to marry them, with the promise of a larger fraction of household utility in return (Choo
and Siow (2006), Reynoso (2017)). These endogenous shares would act like prices. The
missing market for transferring utility between spouses is absorbed into the risk faced on
the marriage market, and increases the gains from insuring against a poor outcome there.
Finally, in the aggregate a larger labor income tax base allows the labor income tax rate
to be lowered in equilibrium to balance the government budget constraint. The means that
expansions in the labor income tax base due to the child care subsidy can increase welfare
for everyone in society by allowing the labor income tax to decrease.
8The assumption of no prenatal investments and the assumption of no genetic persistence in skill are
distinct. For an excellent discussion of studies on the role of prenatal care, see Corman, Dave, and Reichman
(2018). For a discussion of studies on the relationship between genes and cognitive skills, see National
Scientific Council on the Developing Child (2010) and the citations therein.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I build and estimate a framework that incorporates a relevant dimension along
which to target child care subsidies in general equilibrium: family structure. Specifically, I
allow prices, tax rates, the distribution of skill, and family formation to adjust endogenously
in response to the child care subsidy. After estimating the technologies that single mothers
and couples use to invest in their children, I apply the model to compare the welfare effects
of universal subsidies to child care with subsidies targeted at the poor and to one-parent
families with young children. I find that universal child care subsidies yield ex ante welfare
gains of 5.9 percentage points in consumption equivalent units. These gains are 3.5 and
3.9 percentage points higher than subsidies to single mothers or the the poor, respectively.
Compared to the two targeted subsidies I consider, universal subsidies are a better policy
because they more fully insure newborns against the risks they face without disincentivizing
skill investment.
This analysis could be extended to incorporate the effects of different eligibility rules over
the transition from one steady-state to another. The analysis I conduct here is a comparison
of steady-states: in the transition, gains from expansions in the population’s distribution
of skill will take time to realize, and generations who incur the costs of funding the subsidy
without themselves enjoying the gains in skill it affords will see welfare losses. A steady-
state comparison does not account for these dynamics. In addition, the non-parental care
sector can be further elaborated, so that the elasticity of supply for non-parental care can
be disciplined and its implications for large-scale subsidies examined (Blau (1993)). Finally,
more structure could be imposed on the single father problem specification. Most of the
work done on this front has focused on divorced spouses, rather than on those who never
marry, as in my model (Del Boca and Flinn (1995), Tartari (2015)).
As it stands, this paper provides a useful framework for analyzing child care policies in an
environment with heterogeneous family structures, with implications for how such policies
will affect the marriage rate, tax levels, and welfare. This paper also provides new estimates
on how parental time inputs interact with non-parental child care time to affect child skill
accumulation during early childhood, for one- and two-parent families.
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Chapter 3
Estimation of the Skill
Accumulation Technologies
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I describe in detail how the skill accumulation technologies used in the
model of Chapter 2 are estimated. First, I give the functional forms of the technologies
used by one- and two-parent families. Then, using the first order conditions of the family
problems from the model of Chapter 2, I derive estimation equations and map their depen-
dent and independent variables to empirical analogs. I motivate the use of a fixed effects
estimator my demonstrating that unobserved parenting productivies satisfy the require-
ments of that estimator: their are linearally seperable in the estimation equation. Next, I
describe the ECLS-B and the American Time Use Survey (ATUS), which I use to construct
the necessary variables for the estimation equations. This portion of the chapter includes
summary statistics of the data and a discussion of the empirical compositional differences
between one- and two-parent families. Finally, I report the results for the estimation of
skill accumulation technologies, discuss their implications for the results in Chapter 2, and
compare them with other findings in the literature.
3.2 Functional Forms of the Skill Accumulation Technologies
I specify the skill accumulation technologies to be nested constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) functions with inputs of non-parental time, mother time, and father time (which
aggregate to investment Itype) and between investment and the current stock of skill (which
aggregate to tomorrow’s skill). Specifically, the functional forms of the dynamic equation
for skill accumulation, and how investment is generated from time inputs for the two family
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The parameters γ, γs and α control the relative level of inputs given a price ratio. The
values of η, ηs, and ρ control the percentage change in the ratio of inputs for a percentage
change in the ratio of their prices. With this parameterization, I allow for mother time and
non-parental child care time to interact differently across household structures (i.e., I do
not impose γ = γs and η = ηs).
1
3.3 Estimation of Skill Accumulation Technologies
In this section, I explain how I estimate the parameters of the skill technology from the
ECLS-B dataset. The panel nature of the data allows me to use a fixed-effects estimator
to control for heterogeneous productivity shifters on parental time inputs. The equations
that I use to estimate the skill accumulation technology parameters are derived from the
first order conditions of the parenting problem with respect to the quality time of the father
and mother, and non-parental child care time. I assume that the aggregator of maternal
time and non-parental time is the same functional form for both single mothers and married
couples. Married couples differ from single mothers because of the time contribution of the
father, which is modelled as an outer aggregator of father time and maternal/non-parental
time. After taking first order conditions of the parenting problem with respect to the time
investment choices, I take ratios of those equations and then logs. The result is a system
of four linear equations. After deriving these equations with model notation, I explain how
the objects in my model map into variables in the ECLS-B and motivate my use of the fixed
effects estimator. I then provide the estimation equations in terms of observed variables in
the ECLS-B. My derivation of the estimation equations is similar to the method of Lee and
Seshadri (2018).
1A different and common way of specifying the investment aggregator is to include money (goods) and
parental time inputs. See the appendix for an exercise where I measure the contribution of child care costs
to expenditures on children in different age groups, using the 2001 PSID and the 2002 PSID CDS. I find
that child care costs are a sizeable compoenent of money spent on children by any measure of spending
on children I consider (the share ranges from 50 to 70 percent of total spending). My specification makes
explicit how expenditures on children affect child skill accumulation through child time use.
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3.3.1 Estimation Equations
The equations for the investment aggregators of singles and couples are given by (3.3) and
(3.3). The partial derivatives of these equations enter the first order conditions of the
parenting problem with respect to q and n for single mothers and qm, qf and n for married
couples. After taking ratios and then logs of these first order conditions, I get the following
linear equations, one for single mothers and two for married couples. It is apparent that








































































































In the first equation q and n are the quality time and non-parental child care time chosen
by single mothers, respectively, wθ is the hourly wage of single mothers, pn is the price of
non-parental child care, and θ is the parenting productivity of single mothers. In the second
and third equations, qm, qf , and n are the quality time inputs of mothers and fathers and
the non-parental child care time chosen by married couples, wθm is the hourly wage of the
mother, wθf is the hourly wage of the father, pn is the price of non-parental child care
time, and θ, θm, θf are the parenting productivites of single mothers, married mothers, and
married fathers, respectively.
To derive estimation equations for the skill aggregator equation (3.2), I impose intertem-
poral cost minimization, similar to the approach of Lee and Seshadri (2018). This means
that I assume parents set the ratio of the marginal costs of investment (the prices of in-
vestment in each period, as derived above) equal to the ratio of marginal productivities of
investment in each period, appropriately discounting the costs using interest rates. The
result of the following steps will be an equation that expresses the ratio of expenditures
over two consecutive periods on the left-hand side, and the ratio of investment prices over
two consecutive periods on the right-hand side. First, I explain how I derive the price of
skill investment for single and married couples. Second, I construct the equation I will use
to estimate parameters υ and ξ in equation (3.2).
The total expenditures on investment, Xtype,j , is the sum of foregone earnings and non-
parental child care costs for the time invested in the child. For each family type, the
expression for this cost is:
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Xs = (1− τn) pnn+ wθqm (3.7)
Xmc = (1− τn) pnn+ wθfqf + wθmqm (3.8)
Investment expenditures purchase investment input into skill accumulation at a price Λtype:
Xtype = ΛtypeItype (3.9)
An analytical expression for the price of investment Λtype can be derived by taking the ratio
of Xtype and Itype. The solution will be a function of parental skill and the prices of inputs,
which are values the parent takes as given in this model.
For couples, the price of investment Λmc is:
Λmc =


















(1− α) (1− γ)
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Ψ3,mc ≡ (γ (Ψ1,mc)η + 1− γ)
1
η
Ψ4,mc ≡ [α (Ψ2,mc)ρ + (1− α) (Ψ3,mc)ρ]
1
ρ
For single mothers, the price of investment Λs is:
Λs =









γs (1− τn) pn
] 1
ηs−1
Ψ2,s ≡ (γs (Ψ1,s)ηs + 1− γs)
1
ηs
The assumption of intertemporal cost minimization implies that for two consecutive obser-
vations in the data t−1 and t, the ratio of the marginal prices of investment equals the ratio
of marginal productivities of that investment. Notice that here I am allowing childhood to
have multiple periods as in the data, while in my model I assume it is a single period. This
is why I have shifted from using j to index age in the model to using t to reference the period
in the data. In this sense, my estimates of the skill accumulation technology parameters
are quasi-structural. Now, for the objects θc, Xtype, Itype, and Λtype, I add a time subscript

















where type ∈ {s,mc}. Substituting Xtype,tΛtype,t for Itype,t and taking logs of both sides of the
above equation gives a linear equation with the ratio of investment expenses on the left-hand








ξ − 1 ln [1− υ] +
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To control for the last term, which is a ratio of interest rates across periods, I assume a
yearly interest rate of 4% (consistent with the risk-free rate that gives the discount factor
β) and adjust the values 1 + rt in each period t to be proportional to its distance from 0,
the period when the child is born. This means that at age 9 months, the first wave of the
survey, the interest rate is 34×(1.04), while in the second wave of the survey (when the child
is 2 years old) this value is 2 × (1.04). Notice that this last equation does not contain an
additive constant that is cancelled out by a fixed effects estimator. Note also that I did not
cancel parenting and labor market productivities in the definitions of Λtype, in order to make
the mapping from the model to the data more straightforward in the next section. When
constructing prices, I recover the parenting productivity from the fixed effects estimations
used to find the values of η, γ, ηs, and γs. I use those family-level values to build the price
of investment at the family level in each period t.
Mapping Model Objects to Objects in the Data In the data section below, I explain
in detail the procedure I use to prepare the ECLS-B data for estimation. After applying the
procedure I describe there, I observe the following attributes of family i in wave t: hourly
wages w˜i,f,t, w˜i,m,t for father f or mother m, hourly price of child care p˜i,t (which differs
across families and across waves), quantity of child care purchased n˜i,t in units of hours per
week, and hours of quality time contributed by the father f and the mother m: q˜i,f,t, q˜i,m,t.
Here I also put the m subscripts on the single mother variables in the data, which is a
departure from the model notation.
For couples, I estimate η and γ first, and then predict the ratio of mother time and non-
parental child care time at the family level (incorporating the fixed effect levels). This is
then substituted into the right-hand side of the estimation equation for ρ, α with father time
and non-parental child care time on the left-hand side. For the last estimation equation, I
construct investment prices Λ˜type,i,t and expenditures X˜type,i,t for each family in each wave
by using the analogous variables from the data in equations (3.8) and (3.8). Individual-level
parenting productivities θ, θm, and θf are not observed in the ECLS-B. I assume that these
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are time-invariant but can vary across individuals. I denote these unobserved parenting
productivities with θ˜i,m for the mother and θ˜i,f for the father. Rewriting the four equations






























































































































ξ − 1 ln [1− υ] +
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Recovering the Parameters of Interest For estimation purposes, equations (3.14) to


























































In an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation, the assumption that the residual was un-
correlated with the regressors would be violated in equations (3.18) to (3.20) if parenting
productivities and labor market productivity were correlated (unobserved parenting produc-
tivities would be absorbed into the residual). Consequently, in regressions (3.18) to (3.20))
I use a fixed effects estimator, which controls for the time-invariant parenting productivities
by subtracting out the family-level mean and adding back in the population mean. Values
for the population mean are reported under an assumption about the population average
of ln (θi). Since the productivity of non-parental child care is normalized to 1, this level
assumption is equivalent to one about the distribution of the log of relative parent/non-
parent productivities in the population. That is, I assume the population average of the
logged relative parenting productivities is 0. Given that I do not offer empirical discipline
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for this choice, I conduct several robustness checks in the appendix on the share parameters
in the skill accumulation technologies.














































The variables that I need to observe are the ones needed to construct the dependent and
independent variables in the regression equations (3.18) to (3.19). The subscripts denote
family i in wave t, with father f and mother m.
• Parental educational time inputs (q˜i,f,t, q˜i,m,t)
• Non-parental child care time inputs (n˜i,t)
• Hourly wages (w˜i,m,t, w˜i,f,t)
• Hourly non-parental child care prices (p˜i,t)
There are two data sources that I use to measure these variables: the ECLS-B, which is a
panel dataset, and the American Time Use Survey (ATUS), which is a repeated cross-section
sampled from the Current Population Survey (CPS).
The Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Birth Cohort Data for hourly wages,
hourly cost of child care, quality time from the parents in weekly frequency of activities,
and non-parental child care time in hours per week come from the ECLS-B.
The ECLS-B reports incomes, the period of time over which the income was earned (a day,
a week, two weeks, etc.), and the hours worked in a week. From these I can construct
hourly wages for mothers and fathers, if they report these variables. If they did not report
hours worked, I used part-time or full-time status to assign 30 or 40 hours worked per week,
respectively. If they did not report earnings because they were out of the labor force (an
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issue confined mostly to mothers) I imputed their hourly wages using a regression of hourly
wages on education, age, and age squared for the sample on which I could construct wages
with reported income. I then evaluated this regression for observations where I could see
education and age to get imputed hourly wages. Finally, to correct for taxes, I use the
slopes (tax rates) from Table 2 of McGrattan and Prescott (2017). It is after-tax hourly
income, not the directly reported pre-tax income, that I use in the estimation.
For the price of non-parental child care, I use weekly spending on each of the three main
kinds of non-parental child care providers: relative, nonrelative, and center-based. Of these,
I keep the primary source of non-parental child care. To calcuate cost per hour of non-
parental child care, I use the total cost per time unit for the primary source of non-parental
child care, and adjust it by the number of weeks that cost represents and the hours per
week the child spends in that form of non-parental child care. After completing these steps,
I have the price per hour of parental time and non-parental child care at the family level.
I define quality time as activities with the child that include talking and listening, singing,
and reading to them. In the ECLS-B, these are reported as frequency per unit time. To
convert these units into hours per week, I impute time per activity using the ATUS.
The American Time Use Survey Data on levels of time per activity for a parent with
a given set of characteristics come from the ATUS. To impute levels of time per activity
to the ECLS-B, I use a pooled sample from the ATUS from 2003 to 2016. This provides
a time diary along with CPS variables on age, gender, marital status, labor force status,
educational attainment, parental status, and child age. I restrict the sample to parents who
are between 15 and 55, with a child 4 years or younger. I use information on gender, marital
status (married/cohabiting or single), labor force status, and educational attainment, where
educational attainment is discretized into those with less than a college degree or a college
degree and higher. With this information, I group observations from the pooled sample by
their characteristics along the aforementioned dimensions. For each group, I find survey-
weighted averages of time spent on an activity for those who report engaging in it. The
activities whose average duration I tabulate are time spent reading to the child and time
spent talking with and listening to the child.
Imputation After linking parents in the ECLS-B with their appropriate group in the
ATUS, I assign the level of time spent reading, and time spent talking and listening, to their
respective activities in the ECLS-B; additionally, I assign the level of time spent talking
and listening to the singing activity reported by parents in the ECLS-B. I do this because
there is no singing activity reported in the ATUS. Once I have imputed time levels per
activity associated with the ECLS-B sample, I aggregate levels of quality time per parent
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in each family in each wave. This gives me quality time investments, non-parental time
investments, after-tax hourly wages, and non-parental child care prices at the child-family
pair and wave level. I pool cohabiting and married couples in the data and refer to them
collectively as ”married couples.” Single mothers are defined as mothers in the sample who
are a primary caregiver and who do not have a significant other living in the household with
them. In addition, I select only families with observations in all three of waves 1, 2, and 3.
With this information, I can implement the estimation.
Estimating Sample Moments Moments from the estimation samples for couples and
single mothers are presented in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, respectively. I use wave 3 survey
weights provided by the ECLS-B, which are designed to correct for attrition in the sample.




Education Time Father: Hours per Week 5.55 2.94
Education Time Mother: Hours per Week 7.99 2.74
Non-parental Care: Hours per Week 30.47 13.94
Ratio of Time: Father/Mother 0.76 0.50
Ratio of Time: Mother/Child Care 0.41 0.50
Hourly Pay Mother, After Tax 13.90 11.82
Hourly Pay Father, After Tax 15.55 11.97
Hourly Price Child Care 3.93 4.22
Ratio: Hourly Price Child Care/AT Hourly Wage Mother 0.37 0.48
Age Resident Mother 33.05 5.60
Age Resident Father 34.94 6.09
Rates
Mother: BA or higher 0.55
Father: BA or higher 0.47
Marriage Rate 0.92
Below 100 % Poverty Line 0.01
Below 185 % Poverty Line 0.08
Observations 3100
Note: Sample size is rounded to nearest 50, following National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES) requirements.
Based on Table 3.1, the following qualitative points are apparent. First, fathers and mothers
spend substantial time per week engaged in education time with their children. Within
a couple, fathers invest on average 76% of the mother’s time. This will be reflected in
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the complementarity estimates I find for father and mother time in my skill accumulation
technology estimation. Next, I find that reported hours per week in non-parental child care
are 30 on average, but there is a high variation in this level. The relative quantities of the
two time inputs I measure in this sample, along with hourly prices for each, will translate
into large estimated CES shares on non-parental child care. The ratio of mother time to
non-parental child care is on average 0.41, but with a high variation. Married or cohabiting
mothers and fathers have hourly wages that are about four times higher than the hourly
price of child care they use, although there is large variation in all of these prices within my
sample. On average, the price of child care is 37% of the mother’s hourly wage. Poverty in
the sample of married or cohabiting parents is not common: only 1% are below the poverty
line, while only 8% are below 185% of that threshold. Although I pool cohabiting and
married couples in my estimation sample, most of these families are married couples: the
marriage rate is 92%. Both parents are on average in their 30s, and the fraction in this
group with a college degree or more is about half for each gender.




Education Time Mother: Hours per Week 7.08 2.97
Non-parental Care: Hours per Week 35.57 12.37
Ratio of Time: Mother/Child Care 0.26 0.28
Hourly Pay Mother, After Tax 9.13 10.78
Hourly Price Child Care 2.41 2.77
Ratio: Hourly Price Child Care/AT Hourly Wage Mother 0.32 0.40
Age Resident Mother 28.07 6.36
Rates
Mother: BA or higher 0.14
Below 100 % Poverty Line 0.22
Below 185 % Poverty Line 0.42
Observations 1350
Note: Sample size is rounded to nearest 50, following NCES requirements.
Table reftab:SumstatsSMECLSB presents a similar set of statistics for single mothers. Sin-
gle mothers spend only slightly less time than married mothers in educational activities
with their children, but non-parental child care time is on average five hours higher than
for couples. The ratio of mother’s time to non-parental child care time is correspondingly
lower than for couples, at 0.26 (compared to 0.41 for the latter). Within a family, the ratio
of mother time to non-parental child care time is almost half that of married or cohabiting
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families. The poverty rate of single mothers is twenty times higher than couples, at 22%; for
percent of single mothers below 185% of the poverty line is about five times higher, at 42%.
On average, single mothers make about five dollars per hour less than mothers parenting in
couples. The ratio of this price to the mothers hourly wage is five percent smaller than for
married and cohabiting mothers. Finally, the age of single mothers is on average 5 years
lower than married or cohabiting mothers, and their educational attainment is one third
that of married mothers: only 14% of single mothers have a college degree or more.
The comparisons across these two estimation samples help to establish priors about what
the estimates of the skill accumulation technologies of each should look like. Because single
mothers are the only source of parental time for their child, and the amount of non-parental
time purchased is so large, one expects to see a larger CES share for non-parental child
care in the single mother problem, ceteris paribus (I will expand more on that later in this
section).
From the estimation equations, one can see that the fixed effect correction adjusts for
the logged parenting productivity θf or θm (the productivity of non-parental child care is
normalized to 0). When I construct the predicted ratio of mother and non-parental child
care time for couples in equation (3.20), I use fixed effects recovered from equations (3.19).
When constructing investment for the estimation of the outermost aggregator in equation
(3.21), I incorporate parental fixed effects recovered from (3.18) to (3.20).
For estimation weights, I used wave 3 weights—for the primary caregiver survey sample to
estimate {η, γ} and {ηs, γs}, and for the father survey sample to estimate ρ and α. Using
a fixed effects estimator, a requirement for clustering standard errors is heterogeneity in
treatment effects, which is not the case here (see Section 4 of Abadie, Athey, Imbens, and
Wooldridge (2017)). However, because I impute hourly wages for parents who are not
working using age and education, the wages of those observations may have errors that are
correlated at the state level. This imputation is my motivation for clustering the standard
errors at the level of state of residence.
3.3.3 Estimation Results
I estimate the mother/non-parental time aggregator separately for married and cohabiting
mothers whose husbands also filled out a resident father questionnaire. In Table 3.4, this
corresponds to models 1 and 2. Model 3 estimates the parameters governing how father and
mother time combine, and model 4 reports estimates for the aggregator and investment and
current skill. These are estimations of equations (3.18), (3.19), (3.20), and (3.21). Models
1, 2, and 3 use a fixed effects estimator, but model 4 uses an OLS estimator. This is because
I cannot linearly separate the parenting productivities in that equation.
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The nesting order I have chosen restricts the substitutability of father time with mother
time or non-parental child care time to be the same. Alternative nestings would require
that non-parental child care be equally substitutable with mother and father time, or that
mother time be equally substitutable with father time and non-parental child care time.
For couples, I chose the nesting that makes it most comparable with that of single mothers.
I use this rule because there is not a clear ranking of alternative nestings by fit, and the
parameter estimates for couples do not change in a statistically significant way by changing
this restriction with one exception (see the appendix for estimates with alternative nestings).
Table 3.3: Estimation Results: Skill Accumulation Technology
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Single Cohabiting Cohabiting
Mother + Mother + Father + Outermost
Child Care Child Care Not Father Estimation
log(after-tax hourly wage mothercost per hour child care ) -0.308
∗∗∗ -0.497∗∗∗
(0.0856) (0.0522)





log( Λtype,tΛtype,t−1 ) 0.545
∗∗∗
(0.0298)
log( rt−1rt ) 12.13
∗∗∗
(0.674)
Constant -1.117∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗∗ -0.836∗∗∗ 0.770∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.0659) (0.0923) (0.0417)
R2 .1356 .2039 .15 .5053
Observations 1350 3100 3100 2600
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the level of state of residence.
Sample sizes rounded to nearest 50, following NCES requirements. Sample sizes are pooled across waves 1 to 3.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
These results yield the parameters in Table 3.4 for the skill accumulation technologies.
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Table 3.4: Parameters of the Human Capital Accumulation Technology
ρ α η γ ηs γs ξ υ
-1.86 0.07 -1.01 0.24 -2.25 0.03 -1.2 0.82
(0.42) (0.03) (0.21) (0.05) (0.90) (0.04) (0.14) (0.03)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the level of state of residence
and calculated using the delta method.
Except for the single mother share γs, these parameter values are statistically different from
zero at the 5% significance level. As for the single mother share, it has a p-value of 0.47.
The fact that γs is small relative to γ is consistent with my intuition based on sample
summary statics.
When I translate the point estimates of η, ηs, and ρ into elasticities of substitution, the
estimation yields the values shown in Table 6.
Table 3.5: Elasticities of Substitution
Father Married Mothers Single Mothers









Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the level of state of residence.
If the ratio of father over mother wage increases by 1%, the ratio of father time to mother
time invested in their child decreases by 0.35%. If the denominator of both ratios changes
to non-parental child care, the reaction to a 1% change in the former ratio is the same. For
married mothers, a 1% increase in the ratio of the mother’s hourly wage to the price of
non-parental child care decreases the ratio of her time to non-parental time invested in her
child by 0.50%. She is more responsive than married men or single mothers to the price of
non-parental child care. Single mothers are the least responsive: they would adjust the ratio
of their time to non-parental child care time by only 0.31%. The share values, meanwhile,
indicate that the level of her time would already be very low compared to the time inputs
from couples raising children in this economy.
For intuition on the share parameters, consider a single mother whose hourly wage is exactly
the same as the hourly price of non-parental child care care. Setting the prices equal to
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one another provides the clearest intuition for the role of the share parameter, and I chose
to use the single mother technology because it has no outermost nesting like the married
couple does around the ratio of prices of interest (which includes the price I subsidize in my


























Knowing the elasticity of substitution between her time and non-parental child care, the
share parameter pins down the ratio of her time and the time in non-parental child care she
chooses. If these two levels are equal when the prices are the same, then the share parameters
will be 12 ; if the single mother’s quality time inputs exceed the time she purchases in non-
parental child care, even when the prices are the same, then the weight on her time will be
greater than 12 , and vice versa. The degree to which the share parameter needs to adjust in
order to explain the ratio of input choices when the price of each input is the same depends
on the value of the complementarity parameter ηs. The more complementary the two inputs
are, the more the share parameter will need to adjust to explain a large difference in their
input levels.
3.4 Discussion of Estimation Results
There are three main takeaways from the skill technology estimation. First, the share
parameters on father time and single mother time inputs are very low. Even if their hourly
wages were the same as the prices of the other inputs in their technology, ratios of investment
inputs would still show a relatively low level of inputs coming from their quality time. This is
independent of the composition of hourly wages in either group. By contrast, non-parental
child care has a large share in the investment technologies of both one- and two-parent
families. If this share were zero, changes in the price of non-parental child care incurred by
families (due to a subsidy such as the ones I examine) would have no effect on the price of
investment or the skill accumulation of children.
The second takeaway concerns the relative elasticities of the three parental inputs with
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respect to non-parental child care. A 1% increase in the ratio of a single mother’s hourly
wage to the price of non-parental child care causes her to adjust the ratio of her time input
to non-parental child care by 0.31%. She does not heavily readjust her investment input
choices because of the price change. Married mothers, by comparison, adjust their input
choices more—by 0.50%. A subsidy to non-parental child care will cause them to shift more
heavily towards that input than for single mothers. Fathers parenting in a couple have an
intermediate elasticity: they are more responsive to the ratio of input prices than single
mothers, but less responsive than their wives. This matters for policy analysis in general
equilibrium, such as the one I conduct, because it is informative about what one can expect
parents in the economy to do with their time in the presence of a subsidy. All parents will
shift inputs away from their own time and toward non-parental child care if the latter’s
price decreases. Ceteris paribus, this shift will not be dramatic; to achieve large changes in
time use, the subsidy will have to be large. Time use is relevant because if parents easily
substituted away from parenting and (at least partially) into time spent working, this would
be a source of expansion in the tax base. My estimates indicate that expansions in the tax
base from parents substituting away from parenting quality time and into labor should be
expected to be small. Changes in the tax base will have to come instead from changes in
the population distribution of skill rather than changes in parental time use.
The third and final takeaway is the role of investment in the outermost aggregator, which
takes investment and the current stock of skill to produce tomorrow’s skill. The share
parameter on investment is high: its role in producing tomorrow’s skill dominates the role of
the current stock of skill. In addition, the complementarity parameter between investment
and skill is ξ = −1.2, which means that they are more complementary than allowed in
a Cobb-Douglas parameterization. The corresponding elasticity of substitution is 0.45.
Consider the multi-period estimation formulation presented above, and the intertemporal
cost minimization equation that I use to derive my estimation equation for ξ. If the ratio of
investment prices today and tomorrow changes by 1%, this estimate says that the ratio of
investments today and tomorrow will change by 0.45%. The distribution of investments over
time is not very sensitive to changes in the price of that investment across periods. In my
model, unlike in the estimation data, there is a single period of childhood. In that context,
there is no intertemporal cost minimization decision for parents. The interpretation of the
complementarity parameter in a one-period technology is that it determines how quickly
investment increases with the required adjustment to the current stock of skill. For example,
if one wants to increase the current stock of skill by 10 percentage points, a skill accumulation
technology that exhibits high complementarity (lower ξ) will require more investment than
one with greater substitutability, for a given initial skill θc and share parameter υ.
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3.5 Comparison with Other Findings
There is a large body of work on the estimation of skill technologies (e.g., see Todd and
Wolpin (2003) and Cunha and Heckman (2008) for a discussion of specification and estima-
tion issues). Direct comparisons are problematic because specifications vary across studies,
but are nevertheless qualitatively informative. The data requirements vary with the estima-
tion equations; mine require information on time inputs and their prices. One widely cited
estimation is due to Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010). In that study, the authors
use the NLSY79 Children and Young Adults suvey to estimate a CES skill accumulation
technology for a two-dimensional skill vector containing both cognitive and non-cognitive
skills. Each of these dimensions of skill is allowed to affect the evolution of the other dimen-
sion. This skill technology is very general; it nests several specifications examined in other
studies. Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) find substitutability between investment
and skill during early childhood. In that study, the authors are not specific about which
inputs aggregate into investment in skill.
Lee and Seshadri (2018) estimate a skill technology with a single dimension of skill, but
assume that there is no initial draw of skill (or rather, that it is identical for everyone and
equal to 0). They thereby impose by assumption a property that Cunha, Heckman, and
Schennach (2010) found as a result: that in the first period of life, initial investment and the
initial stock of skill are substitutable. For other periods, however, Lee and Seshadri (2018)
are unable to reject a Cobb-Douglas specification. This is a higher level of substitutability
than what I find, but lower than that in Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010).2
My estimates show complementarity between investments and skill early in life. I do not
ignore heterogeneity in the first measure I have of skill at 9 months, as in the specification of
Lee and Seshadri (2018), because it doesn’t appear to be noise in my data and because I have
no observations of the investment that generated that initial stock (motivating regressions
for these two claims are in the appendix). If the investment were solely responsible for
the skill I observe at 9 months, the skill would already be correlated with family income.
That is not what I find. See the appendix of Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) for a
discussion of the implications of substitutability versus complementarity between skill and
2In their 2016 working paper, Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016) the authors show that the assumptions
made in Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) (specifically re-normalization of the latent skill variables)
impose over-identifying restrictions which can bias the estimation of the complementarity parameter. The
direction of the bias is explored in Monte Carlo simulations which demonstrate that the direction of the bias
depends on several attributes of the estimation procedure. My estimation method does not re-normalize skill
distributions in each period. This is because by using intertemporal cost minimization to derive estimation
equation (3.21), I am able to avoid using measures of skill in the estimation of the skill accumulation
technology.
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investment for policy design.
In my framework, children being raised in families with low income are more likely to be
children of single mothers, who use a different technology than couples to invest in their
children. This technology emphasizes non-parental child care more than the one couples
use: the share on parental time is much lower. However, the ability of parents to adjust
their own time use in response to a change in child care prices is higher for couples than for
single mothers. On net, the larger share parameter dominates, so that subsidies targeted to
single mothers target the families whose costs of investment are most sensitive to the price
of non-parental child care. This heterogeneity across family structures is uncovered with
my specification choice, unlike those used in other studies.
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Appendix A
A.1 Motivating Regressions for Model Specification
To motivate my model’s specification, this section provides several regressions using ECLS-B
data.
Table A.1: Predicting Initial Skill with Family Attributes + Prenatal Care
(1) (2) (3)
Married Couples Single Mothers All Mothers
Child is Female 0.174∗ -0.0504 0.116∗
(0.0690) (0.0871) (0.0559)




Hourly Wage: Mother 0.0393 -0.0792 0.0206
(0.0338) (0.0407) (0.0328)
Hourly Wage: Father 0.0517
(0.0283)
Month Began Prenatal Visits 0.0121 -0.00857 0.00789
(0.0387) (0.0425) (0.0301)




Constant 4.277∗∗∗ 4.693∗∗∗ 4.428∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.194) (0.131)
R2 0.0151 0.0141 0.0085
N sub 2900 1350 4250
Barely explains the variance. Units: standard deviations, except for indicators
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Sample sizes rounded to nearest 50, following NCES requirements.
In Table A.1, I regress a child’s test scores at age 4 on family attributes, child initial skill,
and child gender. I do this separately for children of married couples and single mothers,
because family attributes include those of the father for the former but not the latter
(different explanatory variables).
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Table A.2: Time Investments by Child Gender
Married Couples Single Mothers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tot. Parental Time N Time N Time Total Time
Child is Female -0.0845 -0.216 -1.156 0.0434
(0.212) (0.782) (0.850) (0.499)
Child Test Score [0,1] 8.528∗∗∗ 8.281∗∗∗ 1.023 9.945∗∗∗
(0.598) (2.219) (2.477) (1.389)
B.A.: Father 2.104∗∗∗ -0.895
(0.250) (0.904)
B.A.: Mother 1.850∗∗∗ 2.745∗∗ 1.578 3.484∗∗∗
(0.247) (0.881) (1.473) (0.556)
Hourly Wage: Father 0.0105 -0.0248∗
(0.00588) (0.0118)
Hourly Wage: Mother 0.00922∗ -0.0146 -0.0638∗∗ -0.0122
(0.00369) (0.0131) (0.0244) (0.0107)
Constant -2.921∗∗∗ 10.59∗∗∗ 29.68∗∗∗ 18.85∗∗∗
(0.824) (3.134) (3.443) (1.905)
R2 .13 1.1e-02 5.0e-03 1.7e-02
Standard errors in parentheses. N stands for non-parental child care.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Sample sizes rounded to nearest 50, following NCES requirements.
In Tables A.2 and A.3, I report regression analyses I use to motivate two modelling assump-
tions: parents do not target investments by child gender, and initial skill endowments (at 9
months) affect skill outcomes later in life (at 4 years of age). Table A.2 reports four models,
each with a time input choice as the dependent variable. The first two are for married
couples, the second two for single mothers. Time investments are predicted by attributes
of the parents (hourly wages and educational attainment) and attributes of the child (cur-
rent skill). Child gender is not a statistically significant predictor of parental time inputs,
according to Table A.2 . There is some evidence in other studies that parenting behavior
and treatment effects of the program vary by the gender of the child (see ?, Kottelenberg
and Lehrer (2014)), but I do not see this my analysis.
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Table A.3: Predicting Final Skill with Initial Skill + Time Investments
(1) (2) (3)
Married Couples Single Mothers All
Initial Test Score (9 Mo.): Stdzd 0.138∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.0389) (0.0350) (0.0373)
Hourly Wage: Mother 0.0565 0.217∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗
(0.0359) (0.0500) (0.0383)
Hourly Wage: Father 0.0971∗∗
(0.0312)
Child is Female 0.108 0.135 0.0941
(0.0619) (0.0738) (0.0636)




Constant 0.851∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 1.005∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.160) (0.180)
R2 0.1695 0.1273 0.1237
Observations 2900 1400 2900
Initial skill has predictive power. Units: standard deviations, except for indicators
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Sample sizes rounded to nearest 50, following NCES requirements.
Table A.3 reports two models, one for married couples and one for single mothers. The
dependent variable of both in both models is the final skill of the child at age 4. Explanatory
variables include the initial skill of the child, gender of the child, indicators for parental
educational attainment (BA or higher), and parental hourly wages. Initial test scores are
statistically significant predictors for final test scores, and so are parental attributes related
to their skill. This motivates including heterogeneity in initial skill endowments in my
model.
60
Correlation of Child Skill and Family Income
Table A.4: Correlations of Skill and Family Income
(1) (2)
Test Score W1 Test Score W3
Family Income W1 0.000114 0.000651∗
(0.000103) (0.000254)
Flag: Present in model 2 samplel -0.00677 0
(0.00754) (.)
Family Income W3 0.000693∗∗∗
(0.000204)







Correlation p-value .35 0
Income in thousands of dollars. Test scores in standard deviation units.
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Sample sizes rounded to nearest 50, following NCES requirements.
Table A.4 reports a slightly different version of the same qualitative points made with
Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3. The dependent variables in the two models are initial skill and
final skill, with both family structures pooled. Initial income at 9 months has no predictive
power for the initial skill score. At age 4, however, final skill can be predicted with income
(both at age 9 months and 4 years) and the initial test score. In this table I also report
the correlations of the dependent variable for the model (initial skill for model 1, final skill
for model 2) with family income in the same period (initial and final, respectively). These
correlations jump from zero to 0.33. The latter number is my target for the correlation of
child’s skill at the end of childhood with family income. Note that the measure of family
income I use here is income before labor income taxes but including transfers. I use the
analogous object in the model in the internal calibration step.
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A.2 Regression Results with Alternative Nestings
As discussed in the body of this paper, alternative nestings of the CES function imply
different restrictions on the elasticity of substitution between inputs. In this section of the
Appendix, I report skill accumulation technology estimation results analogous to the one
reported in the text, but for different nestings of the technology (Tables A.5 and A.6).
For each nesting, I first give the functional form it assumes. In the titles of the different
specifications, M stands for mother, F stands for father, and N stands for non-parental care.
I give the innermost nesting of the couple problem (F,M) or (F,N), followed by the outermost
one (N, not N), (M, not M). The main qualitative points survive in the alternative nestings.
The first alternative nesting presented below, however, does illustrate that restricting the
substitutability of non-parental child care with mother and father time to be the same
implies unrealistically large complementarity values for mother and father time.
Table A.5: Nesting: (F,M) + (N, not N)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Single Mother + Cohabiting Mother + Childcare + Outermost
Childcare Cohabiting Father Not Childcare Estimation
log( after-tax hourly wage mothercost per hour child care ) -0.308
∗∗∗ -0.559∗∗∗
(0.0856) (0.0507)









log( rt−1rt ) 11.46
∗∗∗
(0.653)
Constant -1.117∗∗∗ -0.427∗∗∗ -0.179 0.729∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.00543) (0.107) (0.0405)
R2 .1356 .0022 .2294 .4566
Observations 1450 3100 3100 2600
complementarity -2.25 -17.28 -.7895 -.8825
complementarity (se) .9046 11.66 .1625 .1035
complementarity (p-value) .0129 .1384 1.2e-06 1.5e-17
share .0258 4.0e-04 .4207 .2534
share (se) .0361 .0021 .052 .028
share (p-value) .4749 .844 6.3e-16 1.6e-19
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the level of state of residence.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Sample sizes are rounded to nearest 50, following NCES requirements.
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Table A.6: Nesting: (F,N) + (M, not M)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Single Mother + Cohabiting Father + Cohabiting Mother + Outermost
Childcare Childcare Not Cohabiting Mother Estimation













log( rt−1rt ) 11.80
∗∗∗
(0.662)
Constant -1.132∗∗∗ -0.313∗∗ -1.015∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.0940) (0.0650) (0.0430)
R2 .1262 .227 .1406 .4925
Observations 1450 3100 3100
complementarity -2.351 -1.757 -1.248 -.9714
complementarity (se) .9908 .4994 .2314 .0976
complementarity (p-value) .0176 4.3e-04 7.0e-08 2.4e-23
share .022 .2768 .0927 .2296
share (se) .0339 .0607 .032 .0236
share (p-value) .5157 5.2e-06 .0038 2.6e-22
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the level of state of residence.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Sample sizes are rounded to nearest 50, following NCES requirements.
A.3 Description of Data Sources
The Early Childhood Education Longitudinal Study, Birth Cohort
The ECLS-B follows a nationally representative sample of families with a child who was
9 months old in 2001. It was designed and collected by the United States Department of
Education. Using birth-certificate data from the National Center for Health Statistics, over
14,000 births were selected within Primary Sampling Units. Children of mothers younger
than 15 were excluded from the sampling frame. There are 5 waves: wave 1 is the 9-
month old data collection round, wave 2 occurs at 2 years, wave 3 at 4 years, and waves
4 and 5 at kindergarten entry. If the focal child was not in kindergarten when wave 4
was collected, the surveyors went back and collected data the next year when they were
enrolled. In addition, if a child repeated kindergarten, their scores were also collected in
wave 5 in addition to wave 4. Each wave contains several instruments; these are different
self-administered questionnaires (SAQs) for different people in the child’s life, in addition
to the child-level data. Table 22 summarizes these instruments in each wave of the survey.
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Table A.7: The Structure of the ECLS-B
Instrument Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4+5
1. Parent Interview Parent Interview + SAQ Parent SAQ Parent SAQ
2. Resident Father Resident Father SAQ Resident Father SAQ ECEP Interview1
3. Nonresident Father Nonresident Father SAQ Preschool Center Director SAQ Teacher
4. Child Care Provider Preschool ECEP SAQ1 WECEP Interview 2
5. Center Director
1 Early Care and Education Provider
2 Wrap-around Care Early Care and Education Provider
In each wave of the survey, the primary care provider (usually the mother) and the resident
father fill out detailed questionnaires on the activities they do with their kids and at what
frequency (once a week, twice a week, once a month, etc.). In addition, they report age,
educational attainment, income, hours worked, the number of hours the child spent in non-
parental care, what type of care that was (relative, non-relative, center-based), and the cost
of that care.
I define quality time as the total amount of time spent (1) reading to the child (2) talking
with or listening to the child (3) singing to the child. To map from frequencies of activities
to levels of quality time supplied by parents, I impute amount of time per activity using data
from the ATUS. The imputation uses common characteristics observed across both samples:
gender, marital status (married/cohabiting or single), labor force status, and educational
attainment. Here educational attainment is less than a college degree, or a college degree or
more. For hourly wages, I use time spent working and income to compute the pre-tax levels,
and then Table 2 of McGrattan and Prescott (2017) to correct for labor income taxes. For
hourly prices of non-parental care, I use total cost of child care and total hours in child care
for the primary source of non-parental care reported by the primary caregiver of the survey
child subject.
American Time Use Survey
I use a pooled sample from the ATUS from 2003 to 2016, which is provided with CPS
variables on age, gender, marital status, labor force status, educational attainment and
family structure along with a time diary. I restrict the sample to parents who are between
15 and 55, with a child 4 years or younger. I use information on gender, marital status
(married/cohabiting or single), labor force status, and educational attainment, where edu-
cational attainment is recoded as less than a college degree or a college degree and higher.
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Imputation
In the baseline estimation, I focus on parents of children under 4 years old who are aged
55 and younger. In the ECLS-B this is respondents of waves 1 to 3. I additionally restrict
observations to those who report age, educational attainment, and how often they partici-
pated in the activities of interest explained above. I further restrict the sample by excluding
outliers: I only use those observations for whom after-tax hourly wages are greater than 0.1
cents and no greater than 200 dollars an hour. Finally, I only consider families observed
in each and all of the first three waves of the survey, so that a family-specific mean can be
computed for the fixed effects estimator.
Given these characteristics, I find survey-weighted averages of time spent on an activity for
those who report engaging in it. The activities whose average duration I tabulate are (1)
time spend reading to your child (2) time spent talking and listening. I assign the level of
time spent reading and talking and listening to their respective activities in the ECLS-B;
additionally, I assign the level of time spent talking and listening to the singing activity
reported by parents in the ECLS-B. I do this because there is no singing activity reported
in the ATUS.
Once I have imputed time levels per activity, I aggregate levels of quality time per parent
in each family in each wave. This gives me quality time investments, non-parental time
investments, after-tax hourly wages, and non-parental child care prices at the child-family
pair and wave level. With this information, I can implement my estimation.
Summary Statistics for Raw and Estimation Sample in ECLS-B and Imputation
Sample in ATUS
In the following two subsections I report sample summary statistics for the raw data and the
estimation sample. For the raw data I report by wave of the sample, and for the estimation
sample I pool all the viable observations in the three waves and report statistics on those. I
also report summary statistics for the ATUS sample I used to impute time levels to observed
frequencies of activities in the ECLS-B sample.
Summary Statistics ECLS-B
The following summary statistics describe the ECLS-B data, pooled across family structures
after the imputation from the ATUS, by wave and before data cleaning. The population
moments I use in the internal calibration for the fraction of parents who are single mothers
comes from this sample. The fraction in the sample that also reports variables necessary for
estimation is larger than these population moments. Notice that the fraction below 185%
of the poverty line in the pooled sample is quite high, at 50%. This drop to 40% by the
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time the child is age 4. Averages here include observations for which the response is 0. This
explains why the average age of the father is now lower than the mother’s.
Table A.8: Summary Statistics Raw Sample ECLS-B: Wave 1
Wave 1
Obs. mean sd min max
Education Time Father: Hours per Week 10700 2.88 3.37 0.00 12.67
Education Time Mother: Hours per Week 10700 7.43 3.15 0.00 12.75
Below Poverty Line 10700 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Below 185% of Poverty Line 10700 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Marriage Rate 10700 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00
Cohabitation Rate 10700 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00
Single Mother 10700 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00
Nonparental Care: Hours per Week 10700 14.32 18.53 0.00 70.00
Ratio of Time: Father/Mother 10400 0.44 0.64 0.00 9.93
Ratio of Time: Mother/Childcare 5200 0.54 0.96 0.00 12.75
Hourly Pay Mother, After Tax 5000 11.13 21.46 0.00 788.00
Hourly Pay Father, After Tax 6600 13.43 17.12 0.00 827.40
Cost per hour childcare
After-tax hourly wage mother 3500 3.41 177.25 0.00 10479.04
Hourly Cost Childcare 8250 1.25 3.37 0.00 99.50
Age Res. Mother 10700 28.46 6.64 -1.00 68.00
Age Res. Father 10700 25.16 14.83 -9.00 75.00
Mother: BA or higher 10700 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Father: BA or higher 10700 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
Sample sizes rounded to nearest 50, following NCES requirements.
Table A.9: Summary Statistics Raw Sample ECLS-B: Wave 2
Wave 2
Obs. mean sd min max
Education Time Father: Hours per Week 10700 3.41 4.12 0.00 12.67
Education Time Mother: Hours per Week 10700 7.94 4.04 0.00 12.75
Below Poverty Line 10700 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Below 185% of Poverty Line 10700 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Marriage Rate 10700 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
Cohabitation Rate 10700 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00
Single Mother 10700 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
Nonparental Care: Hours per Week 10700 14.04 18.51 0.00 80.00
Ratio of Time: Father/Mother 9350 0.46 0.57 0.00 9.83
Ratio of Time: Mother/Childcare 4800 0.48 0.76 0.00 12.67
Hourly Pay Mother, After Tax 5100 11.64 26.28 0.00 1004.70
Hourly Pay Father, After Tax 6200 15.14 52.93 0.00 3546.00
Cost per hour childcare
After-tax hourly wage mother 3900 348.68 21649.58 0.00 1345064.75
Hourly Cost Childcare 9000 1.05 2.31 0.00 64.00
Age Res. Mother 9850 29.79 7.02 -1.00 70.00
Age Res. Father 9850 26.20 15.38 -9.00 76.00
Mother: BA or higher 10700 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
Father: BA or higher 10700 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Sample sizes rounded to nearest 50, following NCES requirements.
66
Table A.10: Summary Statistics Raw Sample ECLS-B: Wave 3
Wave 3
Obs. mean sd min max
Education Time Father: Hours per Week 10700 2.22 2.80 0.00 12.67
Education Time Mother: Hours per Week 10700 5.15 3.78 0.00 12.75
Below Poverty Line 10700 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Below 185% of Poverty Line 10700 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Marriage Rate 10700 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
Cohabitation Rate 10700 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
Single Mother 10700 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00
Nonparental Care: Hours per Week 10700 16.53 16.52 0.00 96.00
Ratio of Time: Father/Mother 8100 0.48 0.54 0.00 6.57
Ratio of Time: Mother/Childcare 7100 0.44 0.60 0.00 12.67
Hourly Pay Mother, After Tax 5000 12.58 23.18 0.00 1063.80
Hourly Pay Father, After Tax 5400 15.95 16.97 0.00 506.57
Cost per hour childcare
After-tax hourly wage mother 3200 253.07 10139.75 0.00 419839.25
Hourly Cost Childcare 7500 2.19 3.83 0.00 64.71
Age Res. Mother 9000 32.28 7.56 -1.00 82.00
Age Res. Father 9000 28.16 16.36 -9.00 83.00
Mother: BA or higher 10700 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Father: BA or higher 10700 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Sample sizes rounded to nearest 50, following NCES requirements.
ATUS Imputation Data
For the imputation of time levels per activity, I used a pooled sample from the ATUS 2003-
2016. I divide parents of children 3 and under into bins by labor force status, educational
attainment, marital status and gender. For each bin, I find the average time spent reading,
doing educational activities, and playing with each bin’s children conditional on having
done each activity during the observation period. This is the level I assign to the ECLS-B
sample for time spent talking and listening or time spent singing (educational hours) or
time spent reading (reading hours). Table A.11 displays group averages.
The population of these groups in the ATUS, even over such a large sample period, can be
quite small. For example, only 85 married men not in the labor force with less than a BA
reported reading to their children under 3 between 2003-2016. There were 35 single women
with greater than a college degree (BA), not in the labor force, who reported spending
educational time with their children aged 3 and under.
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Table A.11: ATUS Imputation: Group Means (hours per week)
Reading Educational
Group Hours Obs Hours Obs
Married Male in LF lt BA 0.512 612 0.459 371
Married Male in LF gte BA 0.468 1318 0.528 337
Married Male not in LF lt BA 0.694 85 0.359 43
Married Female in LF lt BA 0.457 778 0.603 472
Married Female in LF gte BA 0.458 1799 0.565 601
Married Female not in LF lt BA 0.556 860 0.640 580
Married Female not in LF gte BA 0.565 1062 0.521 413
Single Female in LF lt BA 0.458 273 0.541 198
Single Female in LF gte BA 0.361 134 0.326 44
Single Female not in LF lt BA 0.501 195 0.670 194
Single Female not in LF gte BA 0.621 34 0.409 35
Measures of Skill in the ECLS-B
There are three skill measures from the ECLS-B that I use in the regressions presented in
Tables 16 to 18, one for waves 1,2 and 3. In wave 1, the ECLS-B reports test scores from the
Bayley Short Form - Research Edition, which is a shortened version of the Bayley Scaled of
Infant Development, Second Edition (BSF-R and BSID-II, respectively). The latter exam
is the standard one for measuring development in children under 42 months of age. The
BSF-R is a shortened version of the BSID-II, asking only some of the questions. Its scores
are then re-scaled to make them comparable with scores from children who receive the
BSID-II. For the initial test score variable used in Tables 16 to 19, I take the scale scores
of the BSF-R at 9 months (in the first wave of the ECLS-B), which are reported both for
mental and motor development. I then take the average of the two, and next I standardize
them to lie between 0 and 1. For the test score value in the second wave, used in Table
17, I do the same procedure with the BSF-R scores recorded at 2 years of age (in wave 2
of the ECLS-B). By age 5, when the child is 48 months, the BSID-II and its subset exam
the BSF-R are no longer an age-appropriate measures of development for children. Instead,
the ECLS-B reports a new assessment battery that covers cognitive development in the
domains of language, literacy, color knowledge, and mathematics. This is reported as the
ECLS-B Direct Cognitive Assessment in several formats. I use the overall scale score of the
Direct Cognitive Assessment and standardize it to lie between 0 and 1. This is the final
test score used in the regressions of Table 18.
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A.4 Child Support Payments from Single Fathers and Trans-
fers as a Fraction of GDP
To discipline child support payments from single fathers, I use Table 3.12 from NIPA,
Census tabulations on family counts in 2001, and the US Census Bureau report ”Custodial
Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support: 2001”. From US Census counts, I set the
number of families in the US in 2001 to 71,787,347. Table 1.1.5 from NIPA gives the total
amount of transfers in 2001 by components: I sum federal benefits from social insurance
funds, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), supplemental security income,
and refundable tax credits and other (which includes payments to nonprofit instutitions and
student loans, among other categories). This totals 815 billion dollars. Combined with the
number of families, this gives about 11,354 dollars per family in transfers in 2001. From the
Census Bureau report, the average level of child support received by custodial mothers was
3,160 dollars in 2001. This makes the average child support payment due as a fraction of
the average transfer to families about 0.28. Transfers as a fraction of GDP use Table 1.1.5
from NIPA in addition to Table 3.12. Total GDP in 2001 was 10,581 in billions of dollars.
After rounding, this makes transfers as a fraction of 8% of GDP.
A.5 Labor Supply in the CPS
To calculate the average labor supply for the data moment in the internal calibration, I
use Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the CPS from 2000. I define hours worked
per week as the self-reported hours worked last week. I assign a 0 for this value for those
who report not being in the labor force. I then find the average hours worked per week,
weighted by the supplement household weight, for those between the ages of 20 and 80
with children under 5 whose marital status is reported as either “never married/single” or
“married, spouse present”. This is a sample of 11,771 individuals, 53% of whom are women
and 88% of whom are married. The resulting moment for average labor supply in this group
is 31 hours per week, or 0.31 when expressed as a fraction of 100 disposable hours per week.
A.6 Earnings Distribution: Model v. Data
In Table A.12, I show how the implied earnings distribution of the baseline equilibrium
compares with that found in the CPS for 2001 by ?, referred to as “HSV” in the table.
The p50/p10 ratio is quite close in the comparison, but the moments involving the 90th
percentile are quite different in my model compared to the data. This is because the data
is characterized by a tail in the income distribution, so that the 90th percentile of earnings
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is quite high relative to other percentiles in the distribution. In my model, by contrast, the
90th percentile is not that much higher than the median earnings level, and so the 90/50
ratio is small relative to it’s empirical counterpart.
Table A.12: Untargeted Moments (Model Fit)
Moment Source Data Model
p50
p10 HSV (CPS) 3.2 2.9
p90
p50 HSV (CPS) 2.4 1.5
Gini HSV (CPS) 0.41 0.27
Notes: Table A.12 compares moments of the em-
pirical earnings distribution with the model base-
line equilibrium.
A.7 Spending on Child Care in the PSID
A common argument in the investment aggregator, instead of child care time, is goods (or
money) spent on the child (examples include Lee and Seshadri (2018), Daruich (2017) and
Abbott (2018). In this section, I use tabulations from the 2001 PSID and 2002 PSID CDS
to show how child care expenses contribute to total expenditures on the child. To do this, I
construct four different measures of total expenditures on the child (Definitions 1 to 4 in the
tables below, with each definition specified in the table footnote). Next, I find the fraction
of each measure of total expenditures that comes from child care. My conclusion is that
child care represents the main component of the expenditures on children in the PSID. In
that sense, using time in non-parental child care as an input, and including expenditures on
child care in the budget constraint of parents, can be viewed as narrowing in on the main
component of expenditures on children and being specific about how it contributes to child
skill accumulation (through time use).
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Table A.13: Definition 1
mean sd count
Ages [0,3] 0.67 0.29 84
Ages [0,5] 0.68 0.28 146
Ages [0,7] 0.71 0.26 223
Ages [0,9] 0.70 0.27 260
Ages [0,11] 0.70 0.27 275
Notes: Table A.13 presents averages by age group for the fraction of total ex-
penditure on children spent on child care. Definition 1 of total expenditures on
children includes child care, money spent on toys, and money spent on school
supplies
Table A.14: Definition 2
mean sd count
Ages [0,3] 0.55 0.28 84
Ages [0,5] 0.58 0.28 146
Ages [0,7] 0.61 0.26 223
Ages [0,9] 0.60 0.27 260
Ages [0,11] 0.60 0.27 275
Notes: Table A.14 presents averages by age group for the fraction of total ex-
penditure on children spent on child care. Definition 2 of total expenditures on
children includes child care, money spent on toys, and money spent on school
supplies.
Table A.15: Definition 3
mean sd count
Ages [0,3] 0.49 0.27 83
Ages [0,5] 0.52 0.27 144
Ages [0,7] 0.55 0.26 220
Ages [0,9] 0.53 0.26 256
Ages [0,11] 0.53 0.26 271
Notes: Table A.15 presents averages by age group for the fraction of total ex-
penditure on children spent on child care. Definition 3 of total expenditures
on children includes child care, money spent on toys, money spent on school
supplies, money spent on vacations, and money spent on clothes.
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Table A.16: Definition 4
mean sd count
Ages [0,3] 0.42 0.24 71
Ages [0,5] 0.43 0.24 126
Ages [0,7] 0.46 0.24 194
Ages [0,9] 0.44 0.23 229
Ages [0,11] 0.43 0.23 243
Notes: Table A.16 presents averages by age group for the fraction of total ex-
penditure on children spent on child care. Definition 3 of total expenditures
on children includes child care, money spent on toys, money spent on school
supplies, money spent on vacations, money spent on clothes, and money spent
on food.
A.8 Single Fathers in the ECLS-B
The ECLS-B provides a non-resident father questionnaire (NRQ) in the first two waves
of the survey. In this section, I document six points about the sample of non-resident
fathers that complete this survey as well as attributes of single mothers in the data. Sample
counts for these tabulations reflect response rates for the questions of interest; here, I
am not restricting by whether I also observe variables necessary for the skill accumulation
technology estimation. In the statistics presented below, I use survey weights for the primary
caregiver sample in wave 2. The main purpose of this section is to establish that relatiely
few single fathers complete the survey, that those who do are not representative of the
sample of single fathers, and that when they do complete the survey their answers and the
answer’s of their child’s mother do not coincide. In addition, Table 33 makes an additional
point about the marital status composition of single mothers: most were never married.
This coincides with the timing and nature of the marriage market in my model.
The first three points are made in Tables A.17 and ??. First, Table A.17 shows that the
response rate of non-resident fathers in each wave is about 1 in 3. Second, Table ?? shows
that the marital status of the corresponding single mother is about the same for the group
of families with a completed NRQ and without a completed NRQ. Third, Table ?? also
shows that most single mothers were never married (about 70% and 65% in the first and
second wave of the survey, respectively). Since I do not model divorce, the composition of
marital status in single mothers is important to check.
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Table A.17: Response Rate NR Questionnaire
(1) (2)
Wave 1 Wave 2
Yes 0.300 0.309
No: Refusal 0.292 0.179
No: Not Permission 0.194 0.270
No: Ineligible, Lack of Contact 0.184 0.179
No: no NR 0.0290 0.0596
No: P not Biomother 0.000628 0.00303
Total 1 1
Obs. 2000 2000
Table A.17 displays response rates of non-resident fathers to the non-resident
father survey in the ECLS-B. Slightly less than one-third of non-resident fathers
respond. Sample sizes rounded to nearest 50, following NCES requirements.
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Table A.18: Marital Status Composition of Mothers with NR fathers, by Questionnaire Response
status
Wave 1 Wave 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Completed NRQ No NRQ Completed NRQ No NRQ
Not Reported 0 0.00369 0 0.000118
Married 0.0640 0.0520 0.0921 0.0980
Separated 0.107 0.119 0.105 0.0939
Divorced 0.0909 0.0929 0.111 0.140
Widowed 0.00320 0.0142 0.00195 0.0169
Never Married 0.734 0.717 0.691 0.647
Not Biomother or Adoptive Parent 0 0.000897 0 0.00439
Total 1 1 1 1
Obs. 650 1350 650 1400
Table ?? displays the marital status composition of families where the biological
parents are not cohabiting (single-parent families). The compositions are broken
down by response status for the non-resident father questionnaire. Sample sizes
rounded to nearest 50, following NCES requirements.
The next three points are made in Tables A.19-A.23. For point four, Table A.19 tabulates
the days since the non-resident father last saw the child. Fathers who complete the NRQ
have seen the child on average 1.5 days more recently than fathers who do not. Fifth, in
Table A.19 I tabulate responses to the question “In a typical week, does [the child’s] father
spend a lot, some, very little, or no time taking care of [the child]?”, for families without a
completed NRQ’s (first column) and for those with an NRQ (second column). Fathers who
completed the NRQ are more likely to be parenting with a resident primary caregiver who
responds “A lot” to this question (35% compared to 12%). Relatedly, Table A.21 shows
that fathers who complete the NRQ are far more likely to have seen their child in the last
month than fathers who did not complete the NRQ (90% versus 46%). Sixth, in Tables
A.22 and A.23 I tabulate the wave 2 responses to the question “When it comes to making
major decisions, please tell me if [child’s] father has no influence, some influence, or a great
deal of incluence on such matters as child care?”, separately for mothers (Table A.22) in
families without an NRQ (column 1) and those with an NRQ (column 2) and fathers (Table
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A.23) who completed the NRQ. Fathers who completed the NRQ think they have a lot
of influence; mothers with children whose fathers completed the NRQ say they have less
influence than the fathers claim, although they report more influence more than do mothers
in families without a completed NRQ.
Table A.19: Wave 1: Number of Days since NRF last saw child
(1) (2)
No NRQ Completed NRQ
No. Days 3.860 2.353
Obs. 1300 650
Table A.19 displays the average number of days since a non-resident father saw
his child in the first wave of the survey, by response status to the non-resident
father questionnaire. Sample sizes rounded to nearest 50, following NCES re-
quirements.
Table A.20: Wave 2: Frequency NRF last provides child care
(1) (2)
No Completed NRQ Completed NRQ
Not Applicable 0.541 0.104
A lot 0.121 0.350
Some 0.117 0.280
Very little 0.0912 0.146
No time 0.130 0.120
Total 1 1
Obs. 1350 650
Table A.20 displays the response to the question: “In a typical week, does [the
child’s] father spend a lot, some, very little, or no time taking care of [the
child]?”, for families without a completed NRQ’s (first column) and for those
with an NRQ (second column). Sample sizes rounded to nearest 50, following
NCES requirements.
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Table A.21: Wave 2: Number of Days since NRF last saw child
(1) (2)
No NRQ Completed NRQ
Don’t Know 0.01 0
Refused 0.01 0
Not Applicable 0.06 0
Less than 1 month 0.459 0.896
More than 1 month, less than 1 yr 0.238 0.0718
More than 1 yr 0.0975 0.0198
No contact since birth/separation 0.133 0.0118
Total 1 1
Obs. 1350 650
Table A.21 compares the amount of time since non-resident fathers last saw their
child, by response status to the non-resident father questionnaire. Sample sizes
rounded to nearest 50, following NCES requirements.
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Table A.22: Wave 2: Mother’s Opinion of Father’s Influence on CC
(1) (2)
No NRQ Completed NRQ
Not Applicable 0.373 0.0207
No Influence 0.341 0.395
Some Influence 0.138 0.260
A Great Deal of Influence 0.148 0.324
Total 1 1
Obs. 1400 650
Table A.22 tabulates mother’s responses to the question: “When it comes to
making major decisions, please tell me if [child’s] father has no influence, some
influence, or a great deal of incluence on such matters as child care?”, by response
status for the non-resident father questionnaire. Sample sizes rounded to nearest
50, following NCES requirements.





A Great Deal of Influence 0.494
Total 1
Obs. 650
Table A.23 tabulates the response of father’s who completed the non-resident
father questionnaire to the question “When it comes to making major decisions,
please tell me if you have has no influence, some influence, or a great deal of
incluence on such matters as child care?”. Sample sizes rounded to nearest 50,
following NCES requirements.
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